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ABSTRACT
We examine democratic policy-making in a simple institution with real-time agenda setting.
Individuals are recognized sequentially. Once recognized, an individual makes a proposal, which is
immediately put to a vote. If a proposal passes, it supercedes all previously passed proposals. The policy
that emerges from this process is implemented. For some familiar classes of policy spaces with rich
distributional politics, we show that the last proposer is effectively a dictator under a variety of natural
conditions. Most notably, this occurs whenever a sufficient number of individuals have opportunities to
make proposals. Thus, under reasonably general assumptions, control of the final proposal with real-time
agenda setting confers as much power as control of the entire agenda.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Democratic institutions are characterized by a wide variety of rules and procedures
for collective deliberation. A central objective of research in political economy
is to identify the eﬀects of these characteristics on policy outcomes, and on the
distribution of political power (see Persson and Tabellini [2001] and Besley and
Case [2001] for recent reviews of the literature). Previous research indicates that
the rules governing agenda setting are especially critical.
The fundamental importance of agenda control was established by McKelvey
[1976,1979], whose primary objective was to study voting intransitivities. McKelvey
considered a model in which proposals are considered in a known, deterministic order
established in advance of all voting (the agenda). The ﬁrst policy is compared to
the second based on majority rule, the winner is compared to the third, and so
forth, with the ultimate victor enacted into law.1 He assumed that voters are
myopic, in the sense that they vote in favor of their preferred policy in every stage,
irrespective of the implications for the ﬁnal outcome. Under fairly weak conditions,
he demonstrated that, for any two policies p and p0,t h e r ei saﬁnite agenda that starts
with p and implements p0. Thus, the ultimate outcome is completely determined
by the agenda. Shepsle and Weingast [1984] subsequently established that the
introduction of strategically sophisticated voting weakens McKelvey’s result, but
does not fundamentally alter the conclusion that the agenda plays a critical role in
policy selection.2
In light of these results, it is important to understand the processes through
which agendas are determined. The existing literature attacks this issue in three
diﬀerent ways. Some papers consider settings in which the agenda is selected by
a single individual (see Shepsle and Weingast [1984], Banks [1985], Miller [1980],
and Bloch and Rottier [2000]). Others assume that the agenda is determined as
the result of strategic interaction among inﬂuential individuals (see Austen-Smith
[1987], Banks and Gasmi [1987], Lockwood [1998], Penn [2001], and Dutta, Jackson,
and Le Breton [2001]). An alternative approach is to ﬁnesse the problem by identi-
1This is known in the literature as a “forward” agenda. With a “backward” agenda, the policy
emerging from the succession of pairwise comparisons is implemented only if it majority-defeats
some exogenously given status quo (otherwise the status quo prevails).
2 More precisely, they demonstrated that, for any two policies p and p
0,t h e r ei saﬁnite agenda
that starts with p and implements p
0 provided that p does not cover p
0. The policy p covers the
policy p
0 if (1) p defeats p
0 by majority rule; and (2) every policy p
00 that defeats p also defeats p
0.2
fying outcomes that are robust, in the sense that they emerge whenever the policy
in question is included in the agenda (see Shepsle and Weingast [1984] and Fere-
john, Fiorina and McKelvey [1987]). Not surprisingly (given the results described
above), the existence of such robust outcomes is diﬃcult to guarantee.3 For the ﬁrst
approach, considerable political power is concentrated in the hands of the agenda
setter. The implications of the second and third approaches for the distribution of
power are less clear.
Despite this variety of approaches, the literature has adhered to the restrictive
assumption that the sequence of proposals is known in advance of all voting (“ad-
vance” agenda setting). For many democratic institutions, the agenda is determined
during the course of deliberation, in “real time,” so that the dynamics of proposing
and voting are interlocked.4 Participants in these processes have the opportunity
and incentive to make diﬀerent proposals depending on the outcomes of previous
votes.
The purpose of this paper is to examine real-time agenda setting in a simple de-
mocratic institution. In particular, we imagine that there is a group of individuals
charged with making a collective choice. There is also an initial status quo policy,
possibly one inherited from previous rounds of deliberation. Individuals are recog-
nized sequentially in some predetermined order. Once recognized, an individual
makes a proposal, which is immediately put to a vote. Individuals are permitted
to condition both their proposals and their votes on all preceding events, including
other proposals and votes. Passage of a proposal requires a simple majority. If a
proposal passes, it becomes the new status quo and supersedes all previously passed
proposals. The policy that emerges from this process is implemented.5
The institution described in the preceding paragraph diﬀers from the standard
model of agenda setting only with respect to the timing of proposals. This per-
mits us to isolate the diﬀerences between real-time and advance agenda setting.
In the sequel to this paper (Bernheim, Rangel, and Rayo [2002]), we explore the
implications of real-time agenda setting for a wider (and more realistic) class of
3For institutions with forward agendas, such outcomes exist only if the policy space contains a
Condorcet winner. However, for institutions with backward agendas and “pork-barrel” politics,
existence is guaranteed, and the robust outcome beneﬁts a bare majority of agents at the expense
of a bare minority. See Shepsle and Weingast [1984] and Ferejohn, Fiorina, and McKelvey [1987].
4For example, in the U.S. Congress, when the queue of unvoted amendments reaches size four,
av o t em u s tb et a k e nb e f o r ef u r t h e rp r o p o s a l sc a nb em a d e( s e eO l e s z e k[ 2 0 0 1 ] ,c h a p t e r5 ) .
5In other words, we model institutions with forward agendas. In Bernheim, Rangel, and Rayo
[2002], we consider insitutions with real-time agenda setting and backward agendas.3
institutions.
We begin our analysis with the observation that real-time agenda setting always
leads to the selection of a Pareto eﬃcient outcome. Consequently, the bulk of
this paper focuses on distribution. For some familiar classes of policy spaces that
give rise to rich distributional politics, we show that the last proposer is eﬀectively a
dictator under a variety of natural conditions. Most notably, this occurs whenever a
suﬃcient number of individuals have opportunities to make proposals. Thus, under
reasonably general assumptions, control of the ﬁnal proposal with real-time agenda
setting confers as much political power as control of the entire agenda. Despite the
fact that a majority is required to pass any particular proposal, the process can lead
to an outcome that makes every member of the group worse oﬀ relative to inaction,
save for the last proposer. Ironically, the last proposer need not have dictatorial
powers unless a suﬃcient number of individuals participate in setting the agenda.6
Accordingly, within the class of institutions considered in this paper, reforms that
appear to be inclusive from a procedural perspective (by promoting “participatory
democracy” or guaranteeing a “right to be heard”) can have the unintended eﬀect
of concentrating political power.
This paper is also related to the literature on stochastic bargaining (see, e.g.,
Baron and Ferejohn [1989], Merlo and Wilson [1995], Diermier and Merlo [2000],
Banks and Duggan [1998, 2000, 2001], and Eraslan [1998]), which similarly considers
institutions in which the members of a group vote on proposals sequentially. As
with real-time agenda setting, each proposal is made after the group has voted on
the previous proposal, rather than in advance of all voting.7 However, in contrast
to the literature on agenda setting, once the group approves a proposal, the process
terminates and the proposal is implemented. Consequently, these institutions do
not allow for reconsideration of decisions once a policy receives majority approval.
This is an important limitation in that, as a practical matter, policy makers can
and do revisit previous decisions (indeed, every policy reform bill has this charac-
teristic). The passage of a bill specifying the policy that is to prevail in some future
year does not typically preclude a legislature from altering that policy by passing
another “reform” bill before the year in question arrives; however, it does alter
6With a single proposal round, the outcome typically depends on the status quo. In particular,
a status quo that is less desirable from the perspective of a majority of the voters leads to a better
outcome for the proposer. See e.g. Romer and Rosenthal [1978].
7In the literature on stochastic bargaining, the order of proposers is determined randomly during
the course of play.4
the default option against which new alternatives are considered. The institutions
studied in the agenda control literature (including the ones examined in this paper
and its companion) are of interest in part because they allow for reconsideration.
This distinction has an important formal counterpart. For models of stochastic
bargaining, proposals may depend upon history for strategic reasons, but there is
no state variable (unless amendments are permitted). To the extent one focuses on
Markov-perfect equilibrium, members of the group might just as well announce their
proposals in advance. In contrast, with real-time agenda setting, history always
matters because there is a state variable (the current status quo).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the
basic model. Section 3 presents some general results, including the selection of
Pareto eﬃcient outcomes and Condorcet winners (where they exist). Section 4
specializes to a familiar policy space with rich distributional politics, and proves
our dictatorship results. Section 5 extends the results to other policy spaces. We
conclude in section 6 with a summary of our ﬁndings, and a discussion of results
from Bernheim, Rayo, and Rangel [2002] concerning alternative institutions, rules,
and procedures. To familiarize the reader with our analytic techniques, we include
the proofs of several key propositions in the text. Other proofs are contained in
the appendix.
2 The Model
Consider a decision-making body (“the group”) consisting of N individuals, labelled
l =1 ,...,N,w h e r eN ≥ 5. To avoid complications arising from tie votes, we assume
for convenience that N is odd. Let M ≡ N+1
2 denote the size of the smallest
majority.
2.1 Policies and Payoﬀs
The group must select a policy p ∈ P,w h e r eP denotes the set of feasible policies.
Let vl(p)d e n o t et h ep a y o ﬀ to individual l if policy p is implemented. Except where
indicated, we impose the following two assumptions throughout:
Assumpiton A1: The policy space P is ﬁnite.
Assumption A2: Individuals have strict preferences over policies: p 6= p0 ⇒
vl(p) 6= vl(p0).5
Assumptions A1 and A2 are relatively innocuous. Indeed, given A1, any fail-
ure of A2 is non-generic. We nevertheless acknowledge that these assumptions rule
out some interesting and important cases, including the familiar “divide-the-dollar”
problem. The analytics of the divide-the-dollar problem are considerably more com-
plicated because one can exploit indiﬀerence to contrive elaborate history-dependent
strategies. However, as we show in section 5, our central conclusions extend to that
case largely intact.
2.2 Procedures for Collective Choice
The collective choice process consists of a sequence of T “proposal rounds.” Activity
prior to each round t establishes some “status quo” policy, pt−1. Round t begins
when individual i(t) is recognized. For now, both the initial status quo policy,
p0, and the order of recognition, i : {1,...,T} → {1,...,N}, are predetermined and
known to all individuals as of round 1. Recognition provides an individual with the
opportunity to make a proposal, pm
t , which can be any element of P. The proposal
is then put to an immediate vote against pt−1. If it receives majority approval
(“passes”), it displaces pt−1 as the status quo policy (pt = pm
t ). If it does not
pass, the status quo policy remains the same for the following round (pt = pt−1).
Equivalently, one can think of any given proposal as adding to, deleting, or replacing
portions of the prevailing status quo policy.8 In eﬀect, the round t proposal consists
of the diﬀerences between pt−1 and pm
t .
The ultimate fate of the policy that emerges from the last proposal round, pT,
is determined in some ﬁnal stage of the collective choice process. As an example,
consider an institution with a “backward” agenda: the ﬁnal stage is a ﬁnal up-or-
down vote against an exogenous policy pE;i fpT wins it becomes law, otherwise
8It may at ﬁrst seem odd to assume that a new proposal, once passed, displaces all policies
previously passed. However, this assumption involves essentially no loss of generality. It is
important to keep in mind that a policy (and therefore a proposal), as we have deﬁned it, involves
a complete description of all collective actions, and not merely the component actions pertaining
to some particular subset of issues. To illustrate, consider the following example. Imagine that
the government faces two choices: whether to build bombers, and whether to save whales. In each
instance, there are two possibilities: build the bombers (B)o rn o t( NB), and save whales (S)o rn o t
(NS). There are four possible policies: (B,S), (NB,S), (B,NS), and (NB,NS). Imagine also that
the initial status quo policy (p0)i n v o l v e sn oa c t i o n( NB,NS). If the ﬁrst recognized individual
wishes to propose to build bombers, he will propose (B,NS). If this passes, and if the second
individual wishes to save the whales, she proposes (B,S). Though the second proposal, if passed,
technically displaces the ﬁrst, it is clear that indivdiuals are actually voting on the incremental
component policy S.6
pE is implemented.9 In most of the paper we focus on the simplest possibility:
pT is directly enacted into law. Nevertheless, for reasons that will become clear
in the next section, it is analytically useful to allow for greater generality at the
outset. For our purposes, we abstract from institutional details and simply assume
that it is possible to derive some reduced form representation of the ﬁnal stage,
Ω : P → P. In other words, when the policy pT emerges from the ﬁnal stage, the
ultimate outcome is Ω(pT). Obviously, this framework includes the special case
of a degenerate ﬁnal stage,w h e r e i npT becomes law without further modiﬁcation
(Ω(p) ≡ p).
2.3 Behavioral assumptions
Throughout our analysis, we assume that (1) individuals are strategically sophis-
ticated, and (2) they always vote as if they are pivotal. We make the second as-
sumption to deal with the familiar problem of indiﬀerence among non-pivotal voters,
which otherwise gives rise to a vast multiplicity of equilibria. The equilibria that we
rule out through the second assumption are unreasonable because agents cast votes
that are contrary to their true preferences. Together, our two assumptions imply
that individuals compare the continuation equilibrium if a proposal passes with the
continuation equilibrium if it is defeated, and cast their vote for the option that
yields the preferred continuation path. We also conﬁne attention to pure strategy
subgame perfect equilibria. Henceforth, the term “equilibrium” should therefore
be construed as indicating a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium with the
preceding characteristics.
3S o m e g e n e r a l r e s u l t s
3.1 An equivalence result for ﬁnal stages
Let Ω(P) denote the image of all points in P under the mapping Ω. Plainly, the
ﬁnal policy outcome must belong to the set Ω(P). Let J ≡ {j | j = i(t)f o rs o m e
t =1 ,...,T}; this is the set of individuals who are recognized at least once.
Our ﬁrst result establishes an extremely simple yet important equivalence prin-
ciple:
9Institutions with ﬁnal up-and-down votes (backward agendas) are considered, among others,
by Ferejohn, Fiorina, and McKelvey [1987].7
Lemma 1: Consider a policy set P satisfying A1 and A2. An institution with
policy set P, initial status quo p0,a n dﬁnal stage Ω yields the same equilibrium
policy outcome as an otherwise identical institution with policy set Ω(P),i n i t i a l
status quo Ω(p0), and a degenerate ﬁnal stage.
The proof of lemma 1 is completely straightforward, and, in eﬀect, involves
relabeling of branches and nodes in the extensive form of the game, as well as
deletion of redundant branches. The lemma is useful because it implies that we can
understand all institutions in this class (including those with backward agendas) by
studying institutions with degenerate ﬁnal stages (i.e., those with forward agendas).
In particular, if one wishes to know the outcome generated by an institution with
a non-degenerate ﬁnal stage, one need only derive a reduced form mapping for the
ﬁnal stage (Ω), and then consider an equivalent institution with a smaller policy
space (Ω(P)) and a degenerate ﬁnal stage.
3.2 The recursive structure of equilibria
L e m m a1i sa l s oi m p o r t a n tb e c a u s ei ta l l o w su st op r o v i d eau s e f u lr e c u r s i v ec h a r -
acterization of the equilibria for these models. This requires some additional nota-
tion.
For any P0 ⊆ P and p0 ∈ P0 deﬁne
Z(p0,P0) ≡ {q ∈ P0 | ∃ S ⊆ {1,...,N} with |S| ≥ M and vl(q) ≥ vl(p0) for all l ∈ S}.
This is the set of policies in P0 that (weakly) defeat p0 by majority rule. The use of
weak inequalities here implies that p0 ∈ Z(p0,P0). However, in light of our genericity
assumption, strict inequalities hold for all other p ∈ Z(p0,P0). Next, deﬁne
ϕl(p0,P0) ≡ arg max
q∈Z(p0,P0)
vl(q).
This represents individual l’s most preferred element of the set Z(p0,P0). Under
assumptions A1 and A2, this function is well deﬁned. Finally, deﬁne
Φl(P0) ≡ ϕl(P0,P0).
This is simply the image of the set P0 under the mapping ϕl(·,P0).
N o ww ee x h i b i tt h er e c u r s i o n . C o n s i d e rﬁrst the following institution:8
Institution #1: T proposal rounds, a recognition order i(t)( f o rt =1 ,...,T), a
policy space P, an initial status quo p0, and a degenerate ﬁnal stage.
Observe that, without altering the game in any substantive way, one can think
of the ﬁnal proposal round as part of the ﬁnal stage. The policy that emerges
from round T − 1, pT−1, then serves as the input for the ﬁnal stage. For any
particular pT−1,s o l v i n gt h i sﬁnal stage is straightforward: i(T) proposes the policy
in P she most prefers among those that (weakly) defeat pT−1.I n o t h e r w o r d s ,
Ω(pT−1)=ϕi(T)(pT−1,P). Lemma 1 tells us that this is in turn equivalent to the
following institution:
Institution #2: T −1 proposal rounds, a recognition order i(t)( f o rt =1 ,...,T−
1), a policy space Φi(T)(P), an initial status quo ϕi(T)(p0,P), and a degenerate
ﬁnal stage.
The preceding argument demonstrates that a basic institution with T proposal
rounds and a degenerate ﬁnal stage is equivalent to another basic institution with
T − 1 proposal rounds and a degenerate ﬁnal stage, where the policy space has
been appropriately reduced, and where the initial status quo has been appropriately
transformed. The same argument implies that these institutions are in turn equiv-
alent to another basic institution with T −2 proposal rounds and a degenerate ﬁnal
stage, where the policy space has been further reduced to Φi(T−1) ◦ Φi(T)(P), and
where the initial status quo has been further transformed.
Where does this argument ultimately lead? Recursive application of the same
equivalence principle implies that the original institution is equivalent to a basic
institution with zero proposal rounds and a degenerate ﬁnal stage, where the policy
space is
Φi(1) ◦ ... ◦ Φi(T−1) ◦ Φi(T)(P),
and where the initial status quo has been appropriately transformed. Since this
institution is completely degenerate, the transformed initial status quo is simply
enacted into law.
According to the preceding argument, for any initial status quo p0 ∈ P,t h e
initial institution must generate an outcome in the set Φi(1) ◦...◦Φi(T−1) ◦Φi(T)(P).
Notice that we can solve for this set through mechanical application of the Φi map-
pings. This allows us to completely characterize all possible outcomes of the leg-9
islative process, for any conceivable initial status quo, without fully specifying the
equilibrium strategies.
For some of the arguments appearing later in this paper, it is also convenient to
deﬁne a function Qt(pt−1) that maps the status quo pt−1 in round t to the eventual
equilibrium outcome. The map is deﬁned recursively as follows:
QT(pT−1) ≡ ϕi(T) (pT−1,P)
and, for t<T,
Qt(pt−1) ≡ ϕi(t)(Qt+1(pt−1),Q t+1(P)).
This intuitive construction corresponds to backward induction. Consider the prob-
lem of individual i(t) in round t when the status quo is pt−1.I fp r o p o s a lp0 passes in
round t, the status quo for round t+1isp0, and the eventual outcome is Qt+1(p0). If
no new proposal passes in round t, the status quo for round t+1ispt = pt−1,a n dt h e
eventual outcome is Qt+1(pt−1). Thus, i(t)’s problem is to choose the best policy in
the set of continuation outcomes Qt+1(P) that can (weakly) defeat the continuation
status quo Qt+1(pt−1)b ym a j o r i t yr u l e .T h es o l u t i o ni sϕi(t)(Qt+1(pt−1),Q t+1(P)).
Note that Qt(P)=Φi(t)◦...◦Φi(T−1)◦Φi(T)(P). Thus, Qt(P) denotes the set of
policies that can emerge as ﬁnal outcomes if one places no restrictions on the status
quo for round t.S i n c e Φl(R) ⊆ R for all R ⊆ P, every application of a Φl mapping
shrinks the set of possible ﬁnal outcomes. It follows that the sets {Qt(P)}T
t=1 are
nested: Q1(P) ⊆ Q2(P) ⊆ ... ⊆ QT(P).
3.3 Pareto eﬃciency
One can evaluate institutions with respect to the eﬃciency and distributional char-
acteristics of the outcomes they generate. With respect to eﬃciency, we have the
following simple result:
Theorem 1: Consider an institution with a degenerate ﬁnal stage and a policy set
P satisfying A1 and A2. Then the outcome, pT,i sP a r e t oe ﬃcient in P.
Proof: We know that pT ∈ Φi(T)(P). Consequently, we need only demonstrate
that all points in Φi(T)(P) are Pareto eﬃcient in P. Consider some p ∈
Φi(T)(P), and suppose contrary to the theorem that it is not Pareto eﬃcient
in P. In light of assumption A2, there is some p∗ ∈ P such that every
individual strictly prefers p∗ to p. We know that there is some p0 such that p =10
ϕi(T)(p0,P) = argmaxq∈Z(p0,P) vi(T)(q). But p∗ ∈ Z(p0,P), and vi(T)(p∗) >
vi(T)(p), which is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Theorem 1 assures us that the collective outcome will always lie on the Pareto
frontier. Consequently, starting in the next section, our analysis focuses on distri-
butional politics.
3.4 Selection of Condorcet winners
Bearing in mind the equivalence result of section 3.1, we will continue to focus on
processes with degenerate ﬁnal stages. In general, there is no reason to believe
that the policy set P will contain a Condorcet winner (deﬁned as a policy that is
majority preferred to all other policies). However, it is natural to wonder whether
the collective choice process will select a Condorcet winner if one exists. As it turns
out, this question is central to a number of the results proven in later sections.
Plainly, there are institutions of the form considered here that do not select
Condorcet winners. As an example, consider an institution with a single proposal
round. For any given initial status quo p0, there is no particular reason to believe
that the Condorcet winner, pc, is the recognized individual’s preferred outcome in
Z(p0,P). Indeed, it is entirely possible that this individual prefers p0 to pc.
Despite the preceding observation, the group will select a Condorcet winner,
assuming that one exists, provided that a suﬃciently diversiﬁed set of individuals
have opportunities to make proposals.
Theorem 2: Consider an institution with a degenerate ﬁnal stage, and a policy set
satisfying A1 and A2. Suppose that there is a Condorcet winner pc in P.T h e n
pc is the ﬁnal outcome regardless of the initial status quo (i.e., Q1(P)={pc})
whenever:
(1) |J| ≥ M,o r
(2) pc is the preferred policy in P for some individual l ∈ J.
Proof: Consider any R ⊆ P with pc ∈ R. For all l,w eh a v epc ∈ Φl(R)( s i n c e
pc = ϕl(pc,R)). Moreover, for all p ∈ Φl(R), we have vl(p) ≥ vl(pc)( s i n c e
pc ∈ Z(p0,R) for all p0 ∈ P). Using the fact that Qt(P)=Φi(t) (Qt+1(P))
(with QT+1(P) ≡ P) and applying induction, we therefore know that vl(p) ≥
vl(pc)f o ra l ll ∈ J and p ∈ Q1(P). By assumption A2, it follows that either11
p = pc or vl(p) >v l(pc) for all l ∈ J. Conditions (1) and (2) both rule out
the latter possibility. Q.E.D.
For environments with single-dimensional policy sets and single-peaked prefer-
ences, theorem 2 provides conditions under which the desires of the median voter
prevail (just as in Downs’ [1957] model of electoral competition). From lemma 1, we
know that an analog of theorem 2 holds for basic institutions with non-degenerate
ﬁnal stages whenever there exists a Condorcet winner in Ω(P). This latter obser-
vation will prove useful in the next section.
4 Dictatorship results
To characterize the possible outcomes of the collective choice process with greater
precision, one must place some restrictions on the set of feasible policies. In this
section, we restrict attention to a particular class of policy sets that give rise to
rich distributional politics. Models with similar payoﬀ structures appear elsewhere
in the theoretical literature concerning legislative policy making (see, e.g., Ferejohn
[1974] or Ferejohn, Fiorina, and McKelvey [1987]). We extend our analysis to other
types of policy sets in section 5.
For each individual, we assume that there is an associated “elementary policy.”
Let E ≡ {1,...,N} denote the set of all elementary policies. Each l ∈ E produces
highly concentrated beneﬁts and diﬀuse costs. In particular, policy l generates a net
beneﬁt bl > 0 for individual l,a n dac o s tcl > 0 for every individual (including l).
Ap o l i c yp is a collection of elementary policies. The set of feasible policies P is the
power set of E; that is, the set of all possible combinations of elementary policies.
P includes the empty set ∅, which represents inaction (nothing is implemented).






bl if l ∈ p
0 otherwise.
Henceforth, we will refer to P as a CBDC policy set (for concentrated beneﬁts,
diﬀuse costs). We impose two additional assumptions:
Assumption A3: Total costs are increasing in the number of elementary policies.





Assumption A4: A mutually beneﬁcial policy (relative to p = ∅) exists for all
coalitions consisting of M or fewer individuals. In particular, for every policy
p with |p| ≤ M, bl >
P
j∈p cj for all l ∈ p.
When all elementary policies are equally costly, Assumption A3 is trivially sat-
isﬁed. Consequently, this assumption eﬀectively restricts the degree to which costs
can vary across elementary policies. For our main result, it is possible to relax this
assumption considerably (see section 5).
Assumption A4 guarantees the existence of policies that are preferred to inaction
by a majority of voters. It also guarantees that there exists such a policy for any
bare-majority coalition. If there does not exist a policy that is mutually beneﬁcial
for all members of some majority coalition, then p = ∅ is a Condorcet winner. It
follows that the group selects ∅ under the conditions identiﬁed in Theorem 2, as
well as when p0 = ∅. Ironically, the ability to assemble majoritarian coalitions is
therefore essential for the emergence of the dictatorial outcomes derived below. Note
ﬁnally that, under assumption A4, the universalistic policy p = E need not maximize
social surplus. Consider, for example, the case of N =5w i t hb1 = ... = b5 =8 ,
c1 = c2 = c3 =2 ,a n dc4 = c5 = 1. Assumption A4 is clearly satisﬁed, but the
surplus maximizing policy is {4,5}.
We divide the analysis of CBDC policy sets into three subsections. The ﬁrst
considers deterministic institutions in which many individuals have opportunities to
make proposals (“inclusive recognition orders”). We demonstrate that, as long a
suﬃcient number of individuals are recognized at some point during deliberations, a
dictatorial outcome emerges for every recognition order and every initial status quo.
The second considers deterministic institutions in which relatively few individuals
have opportunities to make proposals (“exclusive recognition orders”). Our analysis
of these environments shows that the dictatorial policy occurs with high frequency
when this outcome is not guaranteed. The third considers institutions in which the
recognition order, the number of proposal rounds, or both may be random (“random
recognition processes”). Our discussion subsumes the possibility that there is no
ﬁnite bound on the number of proposal rounds. We show that a dictatorial outcome
continues to emerge under reasonable, though somewhat restrictive assumptions
about the manner in which uncertainty is resolved.13
4.1 Inclusive recognition orders
Some collective choice processes plainly yield majoritarian outcomes. Consider,
for example, an institution with a degenerate ﬁnal stage and one proposal round
(T = 1). Imagine that the initial status quo is inaction (p0 = ∅). Then the outcome
necessarily consists of M elementary policies. Speciﬁcally, the policy includes the
elementary policy i(1) and the M − 1 least costly elementary policies other than
i(1).
Compare the institution discussed in the previous paragraph to one that is more
inclusive. In particular, imagine that a large fraction of the individuals — perhaps
all of them — have opportunities to make proposals (an inclusive recognition order).
The latter institution certainly seems more egalitarian. Our next result shows that,
in the presence of real-time agenda setting, greater inclusiveness can concentrate all
political power in the hands of a single individual.
Theorem 3: Consider an institution with a degenerate ﬁnal stage, a CBDC policy
set satisfying A1-A4, and N ≥ 5individuals. Provided that either |J| >Mor
i(T) proposes more than once, the unique outcome is the policy p = {i(T)}.
Theorem 3 identiﬁes conditions under which the last proposer, i(T), is a dictator
in the following sense: she obtains her most preferred outcome, {i(T)}, irrespective
of the initial status quo, the order of recognition, or the costs and beneﬁts associated
with any particular elementary policy (provided that A1 through A4 are satisﬁed).
It is important to emphasize the perversity of this outcome. When, for example, the
initial status quo is the null policy ∅, all individuals other than i(T) strictly prefer it
to the ﬁnal outcome. If the group simply failed to meet, everyone would be better
oﬀ except i(T). The group produces a result that is contrary to the interests of
almost every member, even though no proposal can pass without majority support.
Theorem 3 has the following ironic implication: within the class of institutions
considered in this paper, reforms that appear to be inclusive from a procedural per-
spective (by promoting “participatory democracy” or guaranteeing a “right to be
heard”) can have the unintended eﬀect of concentrating political power. For exam-
ple, a majoritarian outcome results when the group entertains only a single proposal,
but dictatorship emerges when every individual is allowed to make a proposal.14
4.1.1 An example
We illustrate the logic of theorem 3 through a simple example. Suppose that
N =5 ,a n dc1 <. . .<c 5. To stack things against our result, we assume that
the last proposer is associated with the most costly elementary policy (i(T)=5 ) .
The ﬁrst step in solving for an equilibrium is to identify the ﬁnal outcome for every
status quo, pT−1, that the last proposer might inherit. There are two possible cases:
(1) pT−1 does not include 5, and (2) pT−1 includes 5.
Consider case (1). There are four possibilities. Possibility (a): | pT−1| =4
(i.e., |pT−1| = {1,2,3,4}). In this case i(T)p r o p o s e s{1,2,5}, which passes with
the support of individuals 1, 2, and 5. Possibility (b): | pT−1| =3. I nt h i sc a s e ,
i(T) drops the two most expensive policies and adds her own. For example, if
pT−1 = {1,2,4}, she proposes {1,5}, which passes with the support of individuals
1, 3, and 5. Possibility (c): | pT−1| = 2 (e.g., {1,2}). In this case i(T)d r o p sb o t h
of the elementary policies in pT−1 and adds her own. This leads to the dictatorial
outcome {5}. Possibility (d): | pT−1| =1 . I nt h i sc a s ei(T)d r o p st h ee l e m e n t a r y
policy in pT−1 and adds 3 others, including her own. For example, if pT−1 = {1},
she proposes {2,3,5}. Thus, in case (1), the only possible outcomes are of the form
{5}, {5,x},o r{5,x,y} (where x and y are elementary policies other than 5).
Now consider case (2). There are two possibilities. Possibility (a): |pT−1| ≥ 3.
In this case, i(T) drops at least the two most expensive policies other than her own.
For example, if pT−1 = {1,2,3,5}, she proposes {1,5}, and this passes with the
support of individuals 1, 4, and 5.10 Possibility (b): |pT−1| < 3. In this case, i(T)
proposes {5}, and this passes with the support of i(T) along with all individuals
whose elementary policies are excluded from pT−1. For example, if pT−1 = {2,5},
individuals 1, 3, 4, and 5 vote in favor of {5}.11 Thus, in case (2), the only possible
outcomes are also of the form {5}, {5,x},a n d{5,x,y}.
From the preceding arguments, we know that, given the equilibrium behavior of
t h el a s tp r o p o s e r ,t h eo u t c o m em u s tb e{5}, {5,x},o r{5,x,y}. But this implies
that {5} is a Condorcet winner within the set of policies that can survive the ﬁnal
proposal round. In particular, {5} majority defeats {5,x} for all x (only individual
10When pT−1 = {1,2,3,4,5}, i(T)m a yp r o p o s ee i t h e r{1,2,5} or {5}. The latter proposal will
receive majority support as long as the policy {1,2,3,4} is not mutually beneﬁcial for at least two
of the included individuals.
11When pT−1 = {5}, all individuals are indiﬀerent between voting for and against the proposal,
but the outcome is identical in both cases.15
x is opposed), and {5} majority defeats {5,x,y} for all x, y (only individuals x and
y are opposed). Theorem 2 then delivers the desired conclusion.
To illustrate this ﬁnal step, suppose that T =2a n di(1) = 4 (the second-to-last
proposer is associated with the second most costly elementary policy). A careful
review of the preceding arguments reveals that the ﬁnal outcome never includes
elementary policy 4. Consequently, regardless of the initial status quo, individual
4p r o p o s e se i t h e r{5} or (equivalently) something that the ﬁnal proposer can suc-
cessfully replace with {5} (such as {1,2,5}), and this proposal passes. Note that
individual 4 may take the initiative in advocating individual 5’s most preferred out-
come. Note also that proposals may pass with the opposition of those who (naively)
appear to beneﬁt. For example, if the initial status quo is inaction (p0 = ∅)a n d
individual 4 proposes {1,2,5}, the proposal passes with the support of individuals 3,
4, and 5, and with the opposition of individuals 1 and 2. This is because, if {1,2,5}
is victorious, {5} is the ultimately outcome, but if {1,2,5} is defeated, {1,2,5} is
the ﬁnal outcome (since individual 5 proposes it again in the ﬁnal round).
Real-time agenda setting plays a crucial role in the preceding argument, inas-
much as individual 5 must have the ﬂexibility to make diﬀerent proposals when she
inherits diﬀerent status quos. To illustrate, consider again the case where T =2 ,
i(1) = 4, and p0 = ∅, and the equilibrium in which individual 4 proposes {5}.I f t h e
proposal passes, individual 5 proposes {5}, but if the proposal is defeated, individ-
ual 5 proposes {1,2,5}. To see that this ﬂexibility is critical, consider an otherwise
identical institution with advance agenda setting, where individual 5 must make
the same proposal regardless of the prevailing status quo. Suppose that, as on the
path of the equilibrium just considered, individual 4 proposes {5} and individual 5
proposes {5}. If individual 4’s proposal passes, the ultimate outcome is {5}.I f i n -
dividual 4’s proposal is defeated, the ultimate outcome is ∅ (since ∅ majority defeats
{5}). Thus, individuals 1, 2, 3, and 4 all vote against {5} in round 1, and the ulti-
mate outcome is ∅ rather than {5}. The same argument holds for any other round
1 proposal that would ultimately lead to the implementation of {5}.T h u s , w i t h
advance agenda setting, there is no equilibrium that yields the dictatorial outcome.
4.1.2 Intuition and proof
The proof of theorem 3 is based on three intuitive observations. First, if the ﬁnal
proposer inherits her most-preferred policy as the status quo for round T, then this16
policy is implemented (formally, {i(T)} = ϕi(T)({i(T)},P)). This implies:
Property 1: {i(T)} ∈ Φi(T)(P).
Second, regardless of the status quo prevailing prior to the ﬁnal round, the
outcome never includes the elementary policies of more than M individuals. This
is because the last proposer only needs to secure the approval of a minimal winning
coalition. Formally:
Property 2: p ∈ Φi(T)(P) ⇒ |p| ≤ M (proof in appendix).
Third, regardless of the status quo prevailing prior to the ﬁnal round, the out-
come always contains the elementary policy of the ﬁnal proposer. This is because
she can always tailor her proposal to the prevailing status quo. In some instances,
she deletes some elementary policies and adds her own; in others, she adds a collec-
tion of elementary policies including her own. Formally:
Property 3: p ∈ Φi(T)(P) ⇒ i(T) ∈ p (proof in appendix).
Using properties 1 through 3, we argue that {i(T)} is a Condorcet winner in
Φi(T)(P). Consider any other policy p0 ∈ Φi(T)(P) other than {i(T)}. By properties
2 and 3, there are at least M − 1 individuals other than i(T) whose associated
elementary policies are excluded from p0. By property 3, all of these excluded
individuals together with i(T)( am a j o r i t y )p r e f e r{i(T)} to p0. In general, the
identity of the winning majority coalition depends on the choice of p0.
The desired conclusion now follows from lemma 1 and theorem 2. By lemma
1, the institution under consideration is equivalent to one in which there are T − 1
proposal rounds, and for which the policy space is Φi(T)(P)( o n em u s ta l s ot r a n s f o r m
the initial status quo appropriately, but this is inconsequential). By theorem 2, the
institution therefore selects {i(T)} as long as either i(T) is recognized twice, or at
least M distinct individuals are recognized in proposal rounds 1 through T − 1. If
|J| >M, the latter condition is satisﬁed even if i(T) is recognized only once.
4.1.3 Some remarks on the theorem
A few further remarks concerning theorem 3 are in order. First, aside from the
requirement that |J| >M, we have placed no restrictions on the order of recognition.
Some individuals may be recognized once or more than once, while others never have17
opportunities to make proposals. There is no need to cycle through those who are
recognized in any particular order. Indeed, a single individual may be recognized
in several consecutive rounds. It is natural to conjecture that consecutive proposals
are redundant, but this is not the case. Somewhat surprisingly, an individual may
be able to accomplish some objective with two consecutive proposals, but not with a
single proposal. For example, with T = 1, the institution produces a policy with M
elementary components including i(T). However, with T>1a n di(T − 1) = i(T),
the outcome is {i(T)} (this follows by part (2) of theorem 2).
Second, using an alternative argument, one can extend the result to environments
for which diﬀerent elementary policies have the same costs (this violates assumption
A2).12 Since we consider this a knife-edge case, we omit the proof. We take up
other extensions and generalizations in section 5.
Finally, the theorem does not hold for institutions with three individuals (N =
3). The proof breaks down when one tries to establish property 3. To illustrate,
suppose that T =3 ,i(t)=t,a n dc1 <c 2 <c 3. Then the set of continuation











Note that if pT−1 = {1,2} the eventual outcome is {1}. S i n c e1a n d2p r e f e r{1}
to {3}, the latter is no longer a Condorcet winner in QT(P). This undermines
the dynamics that generate dictatorial outcomes. In this case, depending on the
initial status quo, the outcome is either {1} or {2,3}. Since most collective choice
problems involve more than three decision makers in practice, we regard this as a
technical curiosity.
12An alternative argument is required because ϕi(p
0,P
0) may be set-valued. One must also make
an assumption concerning the manner in which individuals resolve indiﬀerence.18
4.2 Exclusive recognition orders
It is natural to question the general applicability of theorem 3. Several objections
come to mind. First, the result requires individuals to know the recognition order
as of round 1. For realistic institutions, there may be considerable uncertainty con-
cerning who will be recognized two or three rounds in the future, let alone twenty or
thirty rounds. A second related concern is that individuals must know the number
of proposal rounds as of round 1. Though it is plausible to assume that there is
a ﬁnite upper bound on the number of proposal rounds that can precede any time-
dated policy, such as the passage of a budget for a given ﬁscal year, deliberations on
any given proposal may vary randomly in length, creating variation in the realized
number of rounds. A third concern is that the result appears to require highly
sophisticated strategic reasoning. The familiar centipede game admits a single sub-
game perfect equilibrium, but this solution presupposes an ability to think through
many layers of strategy. In practice, play of the centipede game fails to unravel as
predicted by theory. Conceivably, our result may be vulnerable to the same criti-
cism. Finally, the requirement that |J| >Mis particularly demanding for groups
with large numbers of members.
In this section, we describe one potential avenue for addressing all of these crit-
icisms simultaneously. Each of the concerns mentioned above relates in some way
to the number of proposal rounds. When relatively few individuals have opportu-
nities to make proposals (formally, |J| ≤ M), one can show that there are always
recognition orders and initial status quos for which {i(T)} is not the outcome. In
this sense, one cannot “improve” upon the requirement that |J| >M . However,
it turns out that non-dictatorial outcomes are unusual: a high fraction of possible
recognition orders generate {i(T)} for all initial status quos even when |J| is small
relative to M. Consequently, we obtain a dictatorial or near-dictatorial outcome
“most of the time” (in a sense made precise below), regardless of the group’s size,
as long as individuals can think ahead strategically only a small of number of steps,
and as long as they properly anticipate the number of remaining rounds and the
order of recognition once the end of deliberations draws near.
We begin our analysis of exclusive recognition orders by deriving several condi-
tions under which the dictatorial outcome emerges even for small |J|. The statement
of this theorem requires the following deﬁnitions: HK denotes the set of individu-
als associated with the K most costly policies in E\i(T), and i∗
K is the individual19
associated with the K-th most costly policy in E\i(T).
Theorem 4: Consider an institution with a degenerate ﬁnal stage, a CBDC policy
set satisfying A1-A4, and N ≥ 5 individuals.
(a) If T ≥ 2 and i(T − 1) 6= i∗
M−1, then the outcome is either {i(T)} or
{i(T − 1),i(T)}.
(b) Under either of the following conditions, the unique outcome is the policy
p = {i(T)}:
(b1) some member of HM−2 ∪{i(T)} has the opportunity to make at least one
proposal prior to round T.
(b2) i(T − 1) 6= i∗
M−1 and i(t) 6= i(T − 1) for some t<T− 1.
Theorem 4 implies that institutions with short recognition orders can produce
non-dictatorial outcomes only in relatively unlikely circumstances. We demonstrate
this by deriving a lower bound on the fraction of recognition orders that generate
the dictatorial outcome {i(T)} for all initial status quos.
Theorem 5: Consider an institution with T>1 proposal rounds, a degenerate
ﬁnal stage, a CBDC policy set satisfying A1-A4, and N ≥ 5 individuals. The
fraction of recognition orders that generate the outcome {i(T)} for all p0 ∈ P
is not less than



















If one imagines that a recognition order is selected at random in an initial stage,
and that this selection process is governed by a uniform distribution over the set of all
feasible recognition orders, then B(N,T) provides a lower bound on the probability
that the collective choice process yields {i(T)}. Figure 1 illustrates the manner in
which this bound changes with the numbers of rounds and individuals. Notice that,
regardless of whether N is large or small, the bound approaches unity for relatively
small values of T. Also notice that the bound is more sensitive to the number of
proposal rounds than to the number of individuals. To understand why this is the
case, consult part (b1) of theorem 4. If any member of HM−2∪{i(T)} is recognized
prior to round T, the outcome is {i(T)}. The probability of not recognizing a
member of this group in any particular round is approximately 1/2f o ra l lN.T h i s20
probability compounds rapidly with the number of rounds, thereby generating the
observed convergence with T. Notice also that the bound is actually increasing in
the number of individuals. This suggests that, contrary to the apparent implications
of the requirement in theorem 3 that |J| >M,f o rﬁxed T dictatorial outcomes are



































Figure 1: The function B(N,T)
The preceding result concerns the fraction of possible recognition orders that
produce {i(T)} for all initial status quos even when |J| ≤ M. We now consider the
conditions under which a particular initial status quo produces {i(T)} regardless of
the recognition order, again even though |J| ≤ M.
Theorem 6: Consider an institution with a degenerate ﬁnal stage, a CBDC policy
set satisfying A1-A4, and N ≥ 5 individuals. An initial status quo p0 ∈ P
leads to the outcome {i(T)} provided that at least one of the following condi-
t i o n si ss a t i s ﬁed:
(i) |J| > 2 and either p0 = ∅ or
P
j∈p0 cj >c i(T),
(ii) |p0| ≤ M − 1 and
P
j∈p0 cj >c i(T),
(iii) |J| > |QT(p0)|.21
Part (i) tells us that, with three or more distinct proposers (a very weak condition
indeed), {i(T)} can be avoided only if the initial status quo consists of a single
elementary policy that is less costly than {i(T)}.T h i s i s a s m a l l f r a c t i o n o f a l l
feasible initial status quos; moreover, this fraction goes to zero as the number of
individuals, N, becomes large. Consequently, if a status quo is selected at random
in the initial stage, and if at least three individuals are recognized, a large group
is almost certain to produce the dictatorial outcome {i(T)}. P a r t( i i )t e l l su st h a t
the dictatorial outcome also emerges when the initial status quo is more costly than
{i(T)} but contains fewer than than M elementary policies, regardless of how many
individuals are recognized. Part (iii) tells us that any initial status quo p0 leads
to the outcome {i(T)} provided that the number of recognized individuals exceeds
the number of elementary policies that would be implemented were i(T) to inherit
p0 as the round T status quo. Since |QT(p0)| <Mfor any initial status quo other
than p0 = ∅, p0 = E,a n dp0 = {j} for j with cj <c i(T), part (iii) is typically weaker
than |J| >M(the requirement in theorem 3).
4.3 Random recognition processes
Next we turn our attention to a more explicit treatment of the possibility, mentioned
at the outset of the previous section, that individuals may be uncertain about the
recognition order, the number of proposal rounds, or both. We demonstrate that
our central result depends not on the absence of uncertainty, but rather on the timing
of the resolution of uncertainty from the perspective of the participants. Under the
conditions identiﬁed below, uncertainty can persist as late as the beginning of the
second-to-last proposal round without undermining our conclusions. Notably, our
analysis subsumes cases for which there is no ﬁnite bound on the number of proposal
rounds.
Imagine that, prior to the ﬁrst proposal round, nature selects the pair (T,i(·)),
where T, the number of rounds, is chosen from the positive integers {1,2,3,...},a n d
i : {1,...,T} → {1,...,N} is a recognition order. Nature might, for example, select
T = T0 with probability (1−λ)T0−1λ for λ ∈ (0,1), and it might select the proposer
in each round through an independent draw from a uniform distribution over the
set of participants. In that case, λ represents a constant termination probability,
there is no ﬁnite bound on the number of rounds, and each participant stands a one-
in-N chance of being named as the proposer in any given round. For our purposes,22
it is unnecessary to provide a general description of the class of random process
governing the selection of (T,i(·)).
Though nature technically selects the number of rounds and the recognition
order in advance, some or all of this information may be revealed to the participants
at later points in time. We identify two polar cases. At one extreme, participants
do not learn the identity of the proposer in each round t until the beginning of t,a n d
T is not revealed until after the ﬁnal round. At the opposite extreme, (T,i(·)) is
revealed prior to the ﬁrst round. We characterize intermediate cases as follows. If,
for any given process, (T,i(·)) is completely revealed (for the ﬁr s tt i m e )b yt h ee n d
of round T − K, we say that the process is characterized by K degrees of advance
revelation. The ﬁrst polar case corresponds to zero degrees of advance revelation
(K = 0), while the second corresponds to T degrees of advance revelation (K = T
for each realization of T).
Our basic framework subsumes the case where (T,i(·)) is revealed prior to the
ﬁrst round (T degrees of advance revelation). Theorem 5 allows us to extend this
conclusion to intermediate cases: it tells us that, under plausible assumptions about
the random process governing the selection of proposers (e.g., that all participants
have an equal chance of being selected in any round), for any process with K degrees
of advance revelation, the probability of a dictatorial outcome is close to unity
provided that K is suﬃciently large. One does not need to make strong, simplifying
assumptions concerning the nature of the random process generating (T,i(·)), nor
to assume that the horizon is bounded.13 Moreover, it is apparent from ﬁgure 1
that even small values of K are suﬃcient to assure a dictatorial outcome with high
probability.
To underscore this last point, consider the case of K =2 ,w h i c hr e q u i r e st h a t ,
before the second-to-last proposal is made, participants know both T (i.e. that
there will be two more rounds) and the identity of the ﬁnal proposer. Part (b1) of
Theorem 4 tells us that the outcome is dictatorial ({i(T)})i fi(T − 1) ∈ HM−2 ∪
{i(T)}. Thus, if all individuals stand an equal chance of being selected as i(T −1),
the probability of achieving a dictatorial outcome is at least M−1
N = N−1
2N ,w h i c h
converges to 1
2 for large groups. Part (a) of Theorem 4 tells us that the outcome
13As an example, imagine that, at the end of each period, there is a probability λ that the players
are told the process will end in K rounds and all remaining proposers are identiﬁed; with probability
1−λ, no information concerning T is revealed, and only the next proposer is identiﬁed. Note that,
from the perspective of the participants, the potential number of rounds remains unbounded until
the process enters the ﬁnal K rounds.23
is either dictatorial or nearly dictatorial ({i(T)} or {i(T − 1),i(T)})i fi(T − 1) ∈
i∗
M−1. Thus, if all individuals stand an equal chance of being selected as i(T − 1),
the probability of achieving a dictatorial or near dictatorial outcome is at least
2(M−1)
N = N−1
N , which converges to unity for large groups.
For some plausible processes, K = 2 (two degrees of advance revelation) is suf-
ﬁcient to guarantee a dictatorial outcome with high probability. To illustrate,
imagine that there exists some set of individuals Θ ⊆ {1,...N} with |Θ| ≥ 3 (e.g.,
elders, faction leaders, or possibly even the entire group) each of whom is always
given one opportunity to make a ﬁnal proposal before the process terminates. More
speciﬁcally, |Θ| rounds prior to termination, participants are told that the process
has entered a ﬁnal proposal phase consisting of |Θ| rounds, and that, in each suc-
cessive round, the proposer will be selected at random (with equal probabilities) at
the beginning of the round from among those in Θ who have not yet made ﬁnal
proposals. We make no other assumptions about the random process generating
(T,i(·)), or about the nature of information revealed prior to round T − |Θ|.N o t e
that any process with a ﬁnal proposal phase is characterized by two degrees of ad-
vance revelation: once the second-to-last proposer is identiﬁed, all participants can
identify the last proposer by default. However, because the process also reveals
some information about i(T)a n di(T −1) in period T −2( s p e c i ﬁcally, the identities
of the last two proposers but not their order), we obtain a stronger result than for
the general case of K =2 . S p e c i ﬁcally, we have:
Theorem 7: Consider an institution with a degenerate ﬁnal stage, a CBDC pol-
icy set satisfying A1-A4, and N ≥ 5 individuals. Imagine that (T,i(·)) is
determined randomly, but that the process is characterized by a ﬁnal proposal
phase. Then, with probability not less than N−2
N , the group adopts the ele-
mentary policy corresponding to whichever individual is randomly chosen to
propose last, and nothing else.
Observe that the probability that the last proposer is eﬀectively a dictator con-
verges to unity as the size of the group becomes large.
5 Alternative Policy Spaces
In section 4, our analysis focused on a particularly simple class of policy spaces. It
is natural to wonder whether our central conclusions hold more generally. In this24
section, we consider three alternative policy spaces. The ﬁrst generalizes the CBDC
assumptions to cases for which there may be multiple elementary policies associated
with each individual. The second considers cases for which multiple individuals are
associated with the same elementary policy, and therefore have common interests.
The third examines the canonical problem of dividing a ﬁxed payoﬀ.
5.1 Multiple projects
By adjusting the CBDC assumptions to allow for the possibility that each individual
is associated with several elementary projects, each with distinct costs and beneﬁts,
we add considerable richness and ﬂexibility to the policy space. Naturally, we can
no longer uniquely associate individuals with elementary policies. Hence, we deﬁne
I = {1,...,N} as the set of individuals, and E as the set of elementary policies. An
elementary policy e is a pair, (i,k) (denoting the k-th elementary policy associated
with the i-th individual). Let Ei be the subset of E consisting of elementary policies
associated with individual i. Under the assumptions stated below, Ei is the outcome
that i would pick if i were a dictator. Let Ki ≡ |Ei|. W ew i l lc o n t i n u et ou s eP to
denote the power set of E,a n dp ∈ P to denote a policy (a subset of E). For any
policy p,d e ﬁne pi = p ∩ Ei.T h a t i s , pi is the set of elementary policies associated
with individual i in the policy p.
A sb e f o r e ,w ea s s u m et h a te a c he l e m e n t a r yp o l i c yb e n e ﬁts one individual at a
cost to all others. We write the beneﬁt of the elementary policy (i,k)t oi as bik,
and we write the cost of this policy to each individual as cik. W ec o n t i n u et o
assume that the cost of any elementary policy is the same to all of the individuals.
Accordingly, we deﬁne the total costs of any policy p as C(p)=
P
e∈p ce. The proof
of the theorem stated below actually uses only the fact that the ranking of the set
P by costs is the same for all individuals. Thus, the assumption can be weakened
to some extent without altering the proof. We also continue to assume that costs
and beneﬁts are additive over elementary policies.
We impose assumptions A1 and A2 as before. Henceforth, K represents the
largest number of elementary policies associated with any one individual, c rep-
resents the highest (c represents the lowest) cost associated with any elementary
policy, and b represents the lowest beneﬁt associated with any elementary policy.
We replace A3 with the following:
Assumption A5: Kc<(M − 1)c.25
Assumption A5 imposes an upper bound on the total costs of all elementary
policies associated with any one individual. For the case of Ki =1f o ra l li,t h i s
assumption weakens A3 in the sense that it requires each elementary policy to be less
expensive than M − 1 other elementary policies, rather than two other elementary
policies.14 We also replace A4 with the following:





Assumption A6 implies that, if one adopts a collection of M −1+K elementary
policies, all individuals associated with elementary policies in this set are better
oﬀ. For the case of K = 1, this coincides (approximately) with assumption A4.15
For K>1, A6 is more demanding that A4 since it requires the beneﬁtf r o ma n y
elementary policy to exceed the costs of more than M other elementary policies.
We are now equipped to state the theorem.
Theorem 8: Consider an institution with a degenerate ﬁnal stage, a CBDC policy
set (possibly with multiple elementary policies for each individual) satisfying
assumptions A1, A2, A5, and A6, and N ≥ 5 individuals. Provided that
either |J| >Mor i(T) proposes more than once, the unique outcome is the
policy p = Ei.
Notice that theorem 3 is a special case of theorem 8 (subject to the technical
qualiﬁcations noted in the previous two footnotes).16 It states that, if the recog-
nition order is suﬃciently inclusive, then all elementary policies associated with
the ﬁnal proposer, and only these policies, are adopted. Thus, the ﬁnal proposer
emerges as an eﬀective dictator in a very strong sense.
5.2 Quasi-distributional politics
Next we extend the CBDC framework to subsume cases in which members of sub-
groups share common interests. Policies are then “quasi-distributional,” in the sense
14By writing the assumption in terms of bounds rather than in terms of the costs of particular
collections of policies, we have actually imposed some incidental restrictions that are not implied
by A3. One can state a version of A5 in terms of collections of policies and thereby generalize A3,
but the notation is less compact.
15The assumptions are not identical, as A6 is stated in terms of bounds, while A4 is stated in
terms of the costs and beneﬁts for collections of policies. One can state a more cumbersome version
of A6 in the latter form that specializes exactly to A4 when Ki =1f o ra l li.
16The proof is more complicated, however, because it is diﬃcult to show that any policy q ∈
Φi(T)(P)c o n t a i n sEi(T) (this was straightforward for the case |Ei| = 1 considered in theorem 3).26
that they aﬀect the distribution of payoﬀs among subgroups, rather than across
individuals. For this class of environments, we can no longer uniquely associate
elementary policies with individuals. As in section 5.1, we deﬁne I = {1,...,N}
as the set of individuals. The set of individuals is partitioned into groups Is,
s =1 ,...,NG,w h e r eNG ≤ N.L e t Ns = |Is| (the number of individuals in
group s). The assignment of individuals into groups is described by a function
r : I → {1,...,NG},s ot h a tl ∈ Ir(l).
Let N∗ denote the median value of Nr(l) over all individuals. Note that this is
not the median group size. For example, if NG = 5 and the group sizes are 4, 3, 2,
1, and 1, then the median group size is 2, but N∗ =3 .
There is one elementary policy for each group. Thus, the set of elementary
policies is given by E = {1,...,NG}. N o t et h a tw ec a na l s ou s eE to denote the
set of groups. When the elementary policy for group s ∈ E is implemented, every
individual bears a cost cs. Each individual l ∈ Is receives a beneﬁt bs.A s b e f o r e ,
payoﬀs are additive. Note that there is a common payoﬀ function, us(p), for all
members of the group s,s ovl(p)=ur(l)(p). The policy set P is once again the
power set of E. N o t et h a tw ec a nu s ep ∈ P either to represent a policy or a
collection of groups.
We continue to impose assumptions A1 and A2. However, we modify assump-
tions A3 and A4. In particular, we replace A3 with the following:
Assumption A7: For any p ∈ P with
P




One can think of assumption A7, like A3, as imposing an upper bound on the
costs of individual elementary policies. For the case where each group consists
of a single individual, it implies that each elementary policy costs less than the
combination of M − 1 other elementary policies. Clearly, this relaxes A3.
Alternatively, one can also think of A7 as imposing a limit on the sizes of the
groups. It always requires N∗ <M− 1.17 Under one set of plausible conditions,
it implies N∗ <M / 2.18 These conditions are not, however, necessary for the result
17If N
∗ ≥ M −1, then A7 requires every elementary polilcy to cost strictly more than maxs∈E cs,
which is impossible.
18If one assumes that total costs are increasing in the number of individuals whose elementary








j∈p0 cj, which is a natural
generalization of A3), then A7 reduces to the statement that N + N
∗ <M(where N denotes the27
stated below. For example, when Nr(i(T)) = N∗ ≥ M, {r(i(T))} is a Condorcet
winner in P. Consequently, the same conclusion as in theorem 9 below follows
directly from theorem 2.
To state our next assumption, we need the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition: A collection of groups L ⊆ E is decisive if
P
s∈L Ns ≥ M.M o r e o v e r ,
L is minimally decisive if, in addition,
P
s∈L Ns −Nk <Mfor all k ∈ L.L e t
Λ denote the set of all minimally decisive collections of groups.
We replace A4 with the following:
Assumption A8: A mutually beneﬁcial policy (relative to p = ∅) exists for all
minimally decisive collections of groups. That is, for all p ∈ Λ,w eh a v e
bs >
P
j∈p cj for all s ∈ p.
Note that, for the case where each group consists of a single individual, assump-
tions A4 and A8 are equivalent.
Finally, for any recognition order, we deﬁne J0 = ∪j∈JIr(j).T h i s r e p r e s e n t s
the set of individuals whose interests coincide with someone who has at least one
opportunity to make a proposal.
Now we are equipped to state the theorem. It is easy to verify that A7 is
never satisﬁed for N = 3. Consequently, the stated assumptions subsume our usual
requirement that N ≥ 5.
Theorem 9: Consider an institution with a degenerate ﬁn a ls t a g ea n daq u a s i -
distributional CBDC policy set satisfying A1, A2, A7, and A8. Assume that
Nr(i(T)) ≥ N∗. Provided that either |J0| ≥ M +
¯ ¯Ir(i(T))
¯ ¯ or some member of
Ir(i(T)) proposes prior to round T, the outcome is the policy p = {r(i(T))}.





|J| >M . In other words, instead of requiring that at least M + 1 individuals
have opportunities to make proposals, we require only that at least M individuals
other than those in Ir(i(T)) are “represented by” those with opportunities to make
proposals. When groups are large, the latter condition is easily satiﬁed even if only
a small number of agents make proposals.
size of the largest group). Note that the latter inequality implies N
∗ <M / 2. It holds whenever
the size of the largest group is less than N/4 ,w h i c hi nt u r nr e q u i r e sN
G ≥ 5.28
Note also that the conclusion stated in theorem 9 depends on the identity of
the last proposer. In particular, this individual must belong to a group of size
N∗ or larger. By deﬁnition, more than half of all individuals belong to such a
group. Thus, if the last proposer is chosen at random (with equal probabilities),
then theorem 9 tells us that one obtains a dictatorial outcome with probability
greater than one-half.
It is useful to identify the analytic problem that arises when Nr(i(T)) <N ∗.T h e
proof of theorem 3 makes use of the fact that i(T) always contrives to make herself
pivotal. This may not be possible in a quasi-distributional setting when i(T)’s group
is small. Consider an example in which there are four groups of sizes 2, 2, 2, and
1, so that N =7 ,M =4 ,a n dN∗ = 2. Suppose Nr(i(T)) = 1. To build a majority
coalition, i(T) must have the support of at least four other members (instead of
the three needed before). Accordingly, if pT−1 = E, the outcome must include
the elementary policies associated with two groups other than Ir(i(T)). But then
ϕi(T)(pT−1,P)m a j o r i t y - d e f e a t s{r(i(T))},s o{r(i(T))} is not a Condorcet winner
in Φi(T)(P).
There is, however, reason to believe that the result might hold with greater
generality, even when Nr(i(T)) <N ∗. In the previous example, i(T) in essence
is required to ﬁnd coalitions of ﬁve individuals (including i(T)) to support any
proposal, rather than the bare majority of four proposals. Thus, the situation
facing i(T) is quite similar to that arising with a supermajority requirement. We
treat supermajority requirements in the sequel to this paper (Bernheim, Rangel, and
Rayo [2002]), and demonstrate that the dictatorship result is surprisingly robust.
Despite the foregoing, note that when the groups are of equal sizes, all groups
have size N∗, so it is no longer necessary to impose a condition on the identity of
the last proposer. Thus, theorem 9 has the following immediate corollary (where
MG ≡ (NG +1)/2a n dJG denotes the set of groups for which at least one member
makes a proposal):
Corollary: Consider an institution with a degenerate ﬁnal stage and a quasi-distributional
CBDC policy set satisfying A1 and A2. Suppose that
(i) Nj = N∗ for all j ∈ E,
(ii) For any p ∈ P with |p| ≥ MG − 1, we have
P
j∈p cj > maxs∈E cs, and29
(iii) For any p ∈ P with |p| ≤ MG, we have bs >
P
j∈p cj for all s ∈ p.
Then, provided that either
¯ ¯JG¯ ¯ >M G or some member of Ir(i(T)) proposes prior
to round T, the outcome is the policy p = {r(i(T))}.
Condition (i) simply says that all groups are of the same size. Under condition
(i), A7 implies (ii), and A8 implies (iii). When each group contains exactly one
individual, condition (ii) generalizes A3, and (iii) is equivalent to A4. Condition
(ii) is never satisﬁed when NG = 3; hence the corollary requires NG ≥ 5 (the analog
of N ≥ 5). Note also that |J| >Mimplies
¯ ¯JG¯ ¯ >M G.
Both theorem 9 and its corollary imply that the policy outcome is {r(i(T))}
whenever any member of Ir(i(T)), and not just i(T), proposes prior to round T.I f
we interpret groups as political parties, this requirement seems innocuous. Thus,
if the last proposer is a member of a suﬃciently large political party, that party
ordinarily dictates the policy outcome.
5.3 Splitting a ﬁxed payoﬀ
Finally, we consider the canonical problem of dividing a ﬁxed payoﬀ (P = ∆N−1,
the unit simplex in RN,a n dvi(p)=pi). This policy space violates assumption A1
and, more importantly, A2 (the generic no-indiﬀerence condition).
The violation of A2 undermines the uniqueness of continuation equilibria, and
thereby complicates the analysis considerably. Nevertheless, provided that one
adopts a reasonable and consistent rule for resolving this indiﬀerence, the outcome
is approximately dictatorial.
To understand the issues raised by the possibility of indiﬀerence, it is useful to
start by deﬁning a weak Condorcet winner within a set R as a policy q ∈ R such
that, for all q0 ∈ R, a majority of individuals weakly prefer q to q0.N o t i c e t h a t , i n
general, nothing assures the uniqueness of a weak Condorcet winner.
Let pj denote the policy for which j receives a payoﬀ of unity (p
j
j = 1) and every
other party receives a payoﬀ of zero (p
j
l =0f o rl 6= j). This is the alternative
that j would select if j were a dictator. It is straightforward to show that pi(T)
is a weak Condorcet winner in the set Φi(T)(∆N−1).19 Somewhat surprisingly, it
19Technically, Φi(T)(∆
N−1)i sn o tw e l l - d e ﬁned unless, as below, one resolves indiﬀerence in a way
that is consistent with the existence of ϕi(T)(p,∆
N−1)f o ra l lp ∈ ∆
N−1.30
is also possible to show that this outcome is the unique weak Condorcet winner in
Φi(T)(∆N−1).20
Were it possible to prove an analog of theorem 2 for unique weak Condorcet
winners, then the implications of theorem 3 would generalize immediately to the
problem of dividing a ﬁxed payoﬀ. When the policy set includes a unique weak
Condorcet winner pwc, and when the recognition order is suﬃciently inclusive, there
does indeed exist an equilibrium that selects pwc. The problem with indiﬀerence is
that, by appropriately contriving the resolution of indiﬀerence at various stages of
the game, one can in many instances achieve other outcomes.
From our perspective, the most reasonable equilibria in such circumstances are
the ones that select pwc. To sustain other outcomes, one must assume that individ-
uals who will receive zero payoﬀs in all continuation paths, and who therefore have
absolutely nothing at stake, resolve their indiﬀerence when making proposals and
casting votes by supporting the course that inﬂicts the most damage on individual
i(T). It is diﬃcult to sustain these outcomes once one rules out malevolence by
imposing a consistent rule for resolving indiﬀerence.
The violation of A1 also introduces some technical problems related to conti-
nuity and openness. We avoid these issues by assuming that the policy space is a






p ∈ RN | p ≥ 0,
N X
l=1
pl =1 ,a n dpl = nε for some n ∈ {0,1,...,m}
)
.
For our next result, we assume that individuals vote in favor of a proposal only
if they expect to be strictly better oﬀ should the proposal pass. We also rule out
complex history dependent punishments by focusing on Markov-perfect equilibria,




of functions that, for each round t, map the status quo to a ﬁnal outcome). We
demonstrate that, with these restrictions, and with at least three proposers (rather
than ﬁve as in our previous results), the ﬁnal proposer receives virtually all of the
surplus. This holds for every possible initial status quo, including equal division.
In such cases, an approximately dictatorial outcome emerges even though every
individual except i(T) would be strictly better oﬀ if the group took no action,
20Indeed, for any other element of this set, p
0, there is some other element, p
00,s u c ht h a ta
majority of individuals strictly prefers p
00 to p
0.31
and even though every proposal requires the approval of a majority to pass. The
outcome is approximately dictatorial in the following sense: as ε approaches zero,
i(T)’s equilibrium payoﬀ converges to unity.
Theorem 10: Consider an institution with a degenerate ﬁnal stage, a policy set
∆N−1
ε ,a n dN ≥ 3 individuals. Consider any Markov-perfect equilibrium
outcome functions (Qt)T
t=1 under which each individual l votes in favor of pm
t
in round t if and only if (Qt+1(pm
t ))l > (Qt+1(pt−1))l . Provided that either
|J| >Mor i(T) proposes more than once, we have (pT)i(T) ≥ 1 − Nε for all
p0 ∈ P.
A natural alternative assumption is that individuals resolve their indiﬀerence in
favor of the current proposal, rather than against it. This case is considerably more
complex. However, one can demonstrate that the outcome satisﬁes the following
two properties (proof omitted): (i) virtually all surplus is divided between i(T),
i(T − 1), and i(T − 2), and (ii) if ε < δ
N for some suﬃciently small δ,t h e na sN
goes to inﬁnity, the surplus received by i(T −1) goes to zero at the rate 1
N,a n dt h e
surplus received by i(T − 2) goes to zero at the rate 1
N2. Thus, in large groups,
the last proposer again receives essentially all of the surplus. One can extend these
results to the non-discretized simplex by invoking suitable equilibrium reﬁnements.
6 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, we have explored the eﬀect of real-time agenda setting on democratic
policy making. Our analysis reveals a surprisingly robust tendency for a natural
and simple class of democratic institutions to produce high concentrations of po-
litical power. In particular, for some familiar classes of policy spaces with rich
distributional politics, the last proposer is eﬀectively a dictator whenever a suﬃ-
cient number of individuals have opportunities to make proposals, as well as under
a variety of related conditions. Thus, under reasonably general assumptions, control
of the ﬁnal proposal with real-time agenda setting confers as much political power
as control of the entire agenda. Moreover, this outcome is more likely to arise when
more individuals have opportunities to make proposals. Ironically, the last proposer
need not have dictatorial powers unless a suﬃcient number of individuals take part
in setting the agenda. Accordingly, within the class of institutions considered in
this paper, reforms that appear to be inclusive from a procedural perspective (by32
promoting “participatory democracy” or guaranteeing a “right to be heard”) can
have the unintended eﬀect of concentrating political power. We have also demon-
strated that institutions belonging to the class considered here yield Pareto eﬃcient
outcomes and select Condorcet winners when they exist.
In Bernheim, Rangel, and Rayo [2002], we examine the sensitivity of our central
conclusions to variations in institutional rules. Some apparently minor procedural
details matter a great deal, while seemingly important rules are actually of little
consequence. Supermajority requirements do little to overcome the dictatorial
power of the ﬁnal proposer. Endogenizing the order of recognition has no eﬀect on
the high concentration of political power when a chair chooses the order in advance
of deliberations, or when the chair makes these decisions round by round but is
aligned with a particular member of the group. In the latter case, even a chair
with “universalistic” objectives (one that wishes to implement as many elementary
policies as possible) may ﬁnd it impossible to manipulate the order of recognition
so as to enact a policy that beneﬁts more than two individuals.
When the rules of the institution permit the group to terminate deliberations
before the ﬁnal round, the power of the last proposer may evaporate. However, the
particular outcome depends on the details of the termination rule. For the least
restrictive rule (one that allows individuals to bundle policy proposals with motions
to preclude reconsideration), political power is simply transferred from the ﬁnal
proposer to the ﬁrst proposer (and perhaps to one other individual) in a signiﬁcant
fraction of environments. When individuals are not permitted to bundle policy
proposals with motions to preclude reconsideration, one can obtain almost anything
from inaction to a universalistic outcome, depending on the initial status quo.
If each proposal is subject to amendment before being put to a vote against
the prevailing status quo, the power of the last proposer evaporates, but in some
instances the group nevertheless selects policies that beneﬁt small minorities (even
a single individual) at the expense of large majorities. A rule precluding the recon-
sideration of elementary policies once they are passed leads to outcomes that beneﬁt
groups no larger than minimal majorities. Ironically, when such a rule is combined
with a supermajority requirement, the ﬁnal outcome beneﬁts a minority of members
at the expense of a majority, and the number of individuals beneﬁting from the ﬁnal
outcome shrinks with the size of the required supermajority. Limitations on the
introduction of new business near the conclusion of deliberations promote inaction.33
Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :For this proof, we use the notation introduced in section
3.2, except that we write Qt(p;P,Ω) rather than simply Qt(p)t om a k ee x p l i c i t
the dependence of this function (suppressed in the notation of the text) on both
the policy space P and the ﬁnal stage Ω.A l s o , w e u s e I to denote the identity
mapping. Fix P,Ω, and p ∈ P. We proceed by induction. Using the deﬁnition of
QT we obtain:
QT(p;P,Ω)=ϕi(T) (Ω(p),Ω(P)) = ϕi(T) (I ◦ Ω(p),I ◦ Ω(P)) = QT (Ω(p);Ω(P),I),
which proves the claim for t = T.
Now suppose the claim is true for t+1, which together with the deﬁnition of Qt
implies:
Qt(p;P,Ω)=ϕi(t) (Qt+1(p;P,Ω),Q t+1(P;P,Ω)) =
ϕi(t) (Qt+1 (Ω(p);Ω(P),I),Q t+1 (Ω(P);Ω(P),I)) = Qt(Ω(p);Ω(P),I),
establishing the result. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3: Aside from properties 2 and 3, theorem 3 is proven in
the text.
To prove property 2, consider p ∈ Φi(T)(P)a n da n yq ∈ P such that p ∈
ϕi(T)(q,P). Suppose that |p| >M.C h o o s e a n y s e t S with i(T) ∈ S and |S| = M,
such that vl(p) ≥ vl(q) for all l ∈ S (existence of S is guaranteed because p ∈
ϕi(T)(q,P), but it may not be unique). S represents a minimal decisive coalition
including the last proposer, all the members of which prefer p to q.C o n s i d e r s o m e
new policy p0 formed by deleting from p all elementary policies associated with
individuals not in S (formally, p0 = p ∩ S). Note that vl(p0) >v l(p) for all l ∈ S
(since total costs are lower). But then vl(p0) >v l(q) for all l ∈ S, which implies
p0 ∈ Z(q,P), contradicting the fact that p = ϕi(T)(q,P).
To prove property 3, it is useful to distinguish between three mutually exclusive
and exhaustive cases, deﬁned by the characteristics of pT−1. For each case, we
describe a p0 containing the elementary policy i(T)w i t h|p0| ≤ M, and we prove
that p0 ∈ Z(pT−1,P). Assumption A4 guarantees that vi(T)(p0) > 0. Since any34
policy p excluding the elementary policy i(T) provides individual i(T) with a non-
positive payoﬀ, this implies that i(T)’s best choice must result in the implementation
of some policy p00 containing the elementary policy i(T), as desired.
Case 1: i(T) ∈ pT−1.I f |pT−1| ≤ M,t a k ep0 = pT−1.I f |pT−1| >M ,s u p p o s e
that i(T) proposes the policy p0 obtained by dropping M−1 elementary policies from
pT−1 other than i(T). The proposed policy improves the payoﬀ to any individual
associated with an elementary policy that is not dropped. Since this group forms
am a j o r i t y ,p0 ∈ Z(pT−1,P).
Case 2: i(T) / ∈ pT−1 and |pT−1| <M.C o n s i d e r a n y p0 such that and i(T) ∈ p0,
|p0| = M,a n dp0∩pT−1 = ∅. By A4, all individuals associated with elementary poli-
cies in p0 strictly prefer p0 to p. Since this group forms a majority, p0 ∈ Z(pT−1,P).
Case 3: i(T) / ∈ pT−1 and |pT−1| ≥ M.C o n s i d e r a n y p0 such that i(T) ∈ p0,
|p0| = |pT−1|−(M−2), and p0\{i(T)} ⊂ pT−1 (in other words, drop M−1e l e m e n t a r y
policies from pT−1 and add i(T)). By A3 and N ≥ 5 (which implies M ≥ 3), all
individuals are better oﬀ except those in pT−1\p0.B u t |pT−1\p0| = M − 1, so
p0 ∈ Z(pT−1,P). Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4: The following argument makes use of properties 1-3
from section 4.1.2. We begin with a lemma. Note that the four cases stated in the
lemma are mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
Lemma 4.1: Consider any q ∈ P.
(i) If
P






(ii) If q = {j} with cj <c i(T) and j 6∈ HM−2, then ϕi(T)(q,P)=E\(HM−2 ∪ {j}),













Proof: For the proof of each part, we use p = ϕi(T)(q,P) for notational simplic-
ity.




k∈q ck.I f i(T) ∈ q, this is trivial (simply drop any elementary policy
from q). If i(T) 6∈ q, the construct p0 as follows: if |q| > 1, drop any two elementary











Next we argue that j 6∈ q and j 6= i(T)i m p l i e sj 6∈ p. Suppose not. Consider
p00 = p\{j}. All individuals but j prefer p00 to p,a n dj prefers p00 to q (since j’s
elementary policy is excluded from both p00 and q and since the cost of p00 is lower).
Thus, all those who prefer p to q also prefer p00 to q,s op00 ∈ Z(q,P). But then i(T)
would propose p00 rather than p, a contradiction.






.L e t S = {i ∈ E | vi(p) >v i(q)}.T h e n |S| = M (if |S| >M,
then p\{j} ∈ Z(q,P), and i(T)p r e f e r sp\{j} to p,s op 6∈ ϕi(T)(q,P)). Since p is less
costly than q,w em u s th a v eE\S ⊆ q and (E\S)∩p = ∅ (otherwise an individual in
E\S would prefer p to q). Since |E\S| = M−1, and since i(T) 6∈ E\S,t h e r ei ss o m e
j0 ∈ E\S with cj0 <c j.C o n s i d e r b p formed by deleting j from p and inserting j0.
Clearly,
P




k∈q ck.T h u s , a l l m e m b e r s o f S\{j} strictly prefer
b p to p and p to q,w h i l ej0 clearly prefers b p to q.S i n c e |(S\{j}) ∪ {j0}| = M,w eh a v e
b p ∈ Z(q,P). But since i(T) strictly prefers b p to p, this contradicts p = ϕi(T)(q,P).
(ii) Since i(T) ∈ p, we know that j strictly prefers q to p. It follows that j 6∈ p
(if not, then p\{j} ∈ Z(q,P), and i(T) strictly prefers p\{j} to p, a contradiction).
Moreover, since i(T) ∈ p and ci(T) >c j, we know that individual i prefers p to q
only if i ∈ p.T h u s , |p| ≥ M.C l e a r l y , E\(HM−2 ∪ {j}) ∈ Z(q,P). Moreover,
with j 6∈ HM−2, this is the lowest cost policy containing i(T) and at least M − 1
other elementary components other than j. Thus, it is i(T)’s best choice.





takes the place of E\(HM−2 ∪ {j}).
(iv) Since i(T) ∈ p and ci(T) > 0, we know that individual i prefers p to q only






it is the lowest cost policy containing i(T)a n da tl e a s tM − 1 other elementary
components. Thus, it is i(T)’s best choice. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fp a r t( b 1 ) :Lemma 4.1 and i(T) ∈ p imply that all members of HM−2
prefer {i(T)} to all other elements of Φi(T)(P). The same is obviously true for
individual i(T). Given that {i(T)} is a Condorcet winner in Φi(T)(P)( s e et h e
proof of theorem 3), part (b1) of theorem 4 follows from theorem 2, part (2).
P r o o fo fp a r t( a ) : If i(T −1) ∈ HM−2∪{i(T)}, we know the outcome is {i(T)}
by part (b1). So, throughout the rest of the proof of part (a), we will suppose that36





≡ LM−1 (note that LM−1 is the set of M −1
least costly elementary policies other than i(T)).
We claim that {i(T−1),i(T)} ∈ Φi(T)(P). In particular, consider q = {i(T),i(T−
1),i ∗
M−1} ∪ HM−2.N o t e t h a t {i(T − 1),i(T)} ∈ Z(q,P) (it is strictly preferred to





). The only elements of P that i(T) prefers
to {i(T − 1),i(T)} are {i(T)} and {i(T),j} where cj <c i(T−1).N o t e t h a t a l l
members of {i(T − 1),i ∗
M−1} ∪ HM−2 strictly prefer q to both {i(T)} and {i(T),j}
(since i(T − 1) ∈ LM−1 and cj <c i(T−1) implies j 6∈ {i(T − 1),i ∗
M−1} ∪ HM−2).
Consequently, {i(T)},{i(T),j} 6∈ Z(q,P). But then {i(T − 1),i(T)} = ϕi(T)(q,P),
as required.
Now we establish that Φi(T−1) ◦ Φi(T)(P)={{i(T)},{i(T − 1),i(T)}}.B y
theorem 3, we know that {i(T)} ∈ Φi(T−1) ◦ Φi(T)(P). Since i(T) ∈ p for all
p ∈ Φi(T)(P) and since {i(T − 1),i(T)} ∈ Φi(T)(P), we have {i(T − 1),i(T)} =
ϕi(T−1)({i(T −1),i(T)},Φi(T)(P)) ∈ Φi(T−1)◦Φi(T)(P). We claim that p 6∈ Φi(T−1)◦
Φi(T)(P) for all other p ∈ Φi(T)(P). Suppose not. Consider any q ∈ Φi(T)(P)s u c h
that p ∈ ϕi(T−1)(q,Φi(T)(P)) for p 6∈ {{i(T)},{i(T − 1),i(T)}}.T h e r e a r e t w o c a s e s
to consider.
(i) i(T −1) 6∈ p.S i n c e {i(T)} is a Condorcet winner in Φi(T)(P), we know that
{i(T)} ∈ Z(q,Φi(T)(P)). But since i(T) ∈ p, individual i(T − 1) strictly prefers
{i(T)} to p.T h u s , p 6∈ ϕi(T−1)(q,Φi(T)), a contradiction.
(ii) i(T −1) ∈ p.S i n c e i(T) ∈ p, we know that |p| ≥ 3. Since p ∈ Z(q,Φi(T)(P))
and |p| ≤ M,w em u s ta l s oh a v e|q| ≥ 3 (otherwise all members of (E\p) ∪ {i(T)},
am a j o r i t y ,w o u l dp r e f e rq to p). Everyone in (E\q) ∪ {i(T)} must then prefer





. But since i(T −1) prefers {i(T −1),i(T)} to p,w eh a v e
a contradiction. This completes the proof of part (a).
P r o o fo fp a r t( b 2 ) : From part (a), we know that Φi(T−1) ◦ Φi(T)(P)=
{{i(T)},{i(T − 1),i(T)}}. All individuals other than i(T −1) strictly prefer {i(T)}
to {i(T−1),i(T)}.C o n s e q u e n t l y , f o r a n y j 6= i(T−1), Φj({{i(T − 1),i(T)},{i(T)}})=
{i(T)}. The desired result follows directly. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m5 :The proof consists of two steps.
Step 1: Characterization of Φi(T−1)◦Φi(T)(P). There are four cases to consider.
(a) i(T − 1) ∈ HM−2 ∪ {i(T)}. Then, by theorem 4, part (b1), we know that
Φi(T−1) ◦ Φi(T)(P)={i(T)}.37
(b) i(T −1) ∈ LM−1 (deﬁned, as in the proof of theorem 4, as the M −1l o w e s t
cost elementary policies other than i(T)). From the proof of theorem 4, part (a),
we know that Φi(T−1) ◦ Φi(T)(P)={{i(T)},{i(T − 1),i(T)}}. Note that, in this
case, Φj ◦ Φi(T−1) ◦ Φi(T)(P)={i(T)} for any j 6= i(T − 1).
(c) i(T − 1) = i∗
M−1 and i(T)i sn o tt h el o w e s tc o s te l e m e n t a r yp o l i c y . W e
claim that, if p is an element of Φi(T−1) ◦ Φi(T)(P), then either p = {i(T)},o rp is
of the form E\(HM−2 ∪ {j})f o rj ∈ LM−1. Suppose Φi(T−1) ◦ Φi(T)(P)c o n t a i n s
some other policy p.C o n s i d e r a n y q ∈ Φi(T)(P) such that p = ϕi(T)(q,Φi(T)(P)).
From the proof of theorem 3, we know that {i(T)} ∈ Z(q,Φi(T)(P)). By lemma
4.1, we know that i∗
M−1 6∈ p.T h u s , i∗
M−1 strictly prefers {i(T)} to p,w h i c hi sa
contradiction. Note that, in this case, Φj ◦ Φi(T−1) ◦ Φi(T)(P)={i(T)} for any
j ∈ HM−2 ∪ {i(T)}.
(d) i(T − 1) = i∗
M−1 and i(T) is the lowest cost elementary policy. Then by
lemma 4.1 parts (i) and (iv), i∗
M−1 6∈ p for all p ∈ Φi(T)(P). But then, by theorem
2p a r t( 2 ) ,Φi(T−1) ◦ Φi(T)(P)={i(T)}.
Step 2. Computation of the function B(N,T). There are two cases to consider.
Case 1: i(T) is not the lowest cost elementary policy. In that case, according
to step 1, the process can yield an outcome other than {i(T)} only if either (a)
i(t)=i(T − 1) ∈ LM−1 for all t<T− 1, or (b) i(T − 1) = i∗
M−1 and i(t) 6∈
























Case 2: i(T) is the lowest cost elementary policy. In this case, according to step
1, the process can yield an outcome other than {i(T)} only if i(t)=i(T −1) ∈ LM−1


































We replace M−1w i t hN−1
2 and factor to obtain the formula for B(N,T). Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m6 :We begin the proof with a lemma.
Lemma 6.1: For any p ∈ P and t<T, the total cost of Qt(p) is not greater than
the total cost of QT(p).
Proof: Note ﬁrst that, for any p ∈ P,i fQt(p) 6= Qt+1(p), then a majority of
individuals must strictly prefer Qt(p)t oQt+1(p).
Next we argue that, for all t =1 ,...,T− 1, the total cost of Qt(p) is not greater
than the total cost of Qt+1(p) (the lemma follows directly). Suppose on the con-
trary the that total cost of Qt(p) is greater than the total cost of Qt+1(p)f o rs o m e
such t.T h e n a l l m e m b e r s o f E\Qt(p)s t r i c t l yp r e f e rQt+1(p)t oQt(p). Indi-
vidual i(T) also prefers Qt+1(p)t oQt(p) (since both policies include i(T)). But
|{i(T)} ∪ (E\Qt(p))| ≥ M (since i(T) ∈ Qt(p)a n d|Qt(p)| ≤ M), which contradicts
the fact that Qt(p) must be majority-preferred to Qt+1(p). Q.E.D.
Now we prove the theorem.
Part (i): Consider once again the four mutually exclusive and exhaustive cases
discussed in the proof of theorem 5, step 1. For cases (a) and (d), Φi(T−1) ◦
Φi(T)(P)={i(T)},s oQ1(p0)={i(T)}. For case (b), Φj ◦ Φi(T−1) ◦ Φi(T)(P)=
{i(T)} for any j 6= i(T − 1), so as long as |J| > 2 (which assures i(t) 6= i(T − 1) for
some t<T− 1), Q1(p0)={i(T)}.
Now consider case (c). We claim that QT(p0) is no more costly than the policy
LM−1∪{i(T)}. By assumption, either p0 =0o r
P
j∈p0 cj >c i(T). First consider the






LM−1∪{i(T)}, as required. Next consider the subcase where
P
j∈p0 cj >c i(T).N o t e
that (p0 ∩ LM−1) ∪ {i(T)} ∈ Z(p0,P)( s i n c ei to m i t sf r o mp0 no more than M − 1
elementary policies). Thus, QT(p0)m u s tb en om o r ec o s t l yt h a nLM−1 ∪ {i(T)}
(or i(T) would propose (p0 ∩ LM−1) ∪ {i(T)} instead).
In light of the preceding claim, lemma 6.1 tells us that Q1(p0)i sn om o r ec o s t l y
than LM−1 ∪ {i(T)}. We know from the proof of theorem 5 that if p is an element
of Φi(T−1) ◦ Φi(T)(P), then either p = {i(T)},o rp is of the form E\(HM−2 ∪ {j})
for j ∈ LM−1. Also recall that Q1(p0) ∈ Φi(T−1) ◦Φi(T)(P). But E\(HM−2 ∪ {j})






.T h u s , Qt(p0)={i(T)}, as desired.39
Part (ii): If |p0| ≤ M − 1a n d
P
j∈p0 cj >c i(T),t h e n{i(T)} ∈ Z(p0,P), so
QT(p0)={i(T)}.S i n c e {i(T)} is strictly less costly than all other policies in
Φi(T)(P)( g i v e nt h a ta l ls u c hp o l i c i e sc o n t a i ni(T)), lemma 6.1 implies immediately
that Q1(p0)={i(T)}.
Part (iii): From the argument given in the proof of theorem 2 and the fact that
{i(T)} is a Condorcet winner in Φi(T)(P), we know that vl (Q1(p0)) ≥ vl({i(T)})
for all l ∈ J\{i(T)}. By lemma 6.1, |Q1(p0)| ≤ |QT(p0)| < |J|. Consequently,
since i(T) ∈ Q1(p0), there exists l0 ∈ J\{i(T)} such that l0 6∈ Q1(p0). But then
vl0 (Q1(p0)) ≥ vl0({i(T)})i m p l i e sQ1(p0)={i(T)}. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m7 :Consider the selection of a proposal in round T −2. Let
iA and iB denote the two members of Θ who make proposals after T −2. Suppose
in addition that i∗
M−1 / ∈ {iA,i B} (which occurs with probability N−2
N ). According
to part (a) of theorem 4, all individuals know that, if ik is chosen to propose last
(k = A,B), the ﬁnal outcome will be either {ik} or {iA,i B}. From the perspective of
round T −2, all individuals other than iA and iB (including i(T −2)) would therefore
strictly prefer an outcome that produces iA when iA is chosen to propose last, and
iB when B is chosen to propose last, to any other outcome that is achievable given
the continuation equilibria for rounds T −1a n dT. Suppose that i(T −2) proposes
{iA,i B}, and that the proposal passes. In round T − 1, all individuals other than
iA and iB know that if they vote against pm
t (regardless of what it is), the ultimate
outcome will be ik (with pT−1 = {iA,i B}, ik will propose {ik} in the ﬁnal round,
and this will pass). Consequently, they will vote for pm
t only if it also yields {ik}
as the ﬁnal outcome. Thus, passing the proposal {iA,i B} in round T − 2 produces
iA when iA is chosen to propose last, and iB when iB is chosen to propose last. If
i(T − 2)’s equilibrium proposal led to any other outcome, i(T − 2) would have an
incentive to deviate to the proposal {iA,i B}, and all individuals other than iA and
iB would have an incentive to support it. Thus, as long as i∗
M−1 / ∈ {iA,i B},t h e
process implements the elementary policy associated with the last proposer, and
nothing else. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m8 :We begin with some notation. For any i ∈ I and q ∈ P,
let G(q) denote some set of M − 1 individuals, not including i(T), satisfying the




≥ vj(q). That is, G(q)r e p r e -
sents a group of M − 1 individuals other than i(T) who (weakly) prefer ϕi(T)(q,P)40
to q (by A2, equality will hold only if q = ϕi(T)(q,P)). By the deﬁnition of ϕi(T)(·),
one can always identify such a group, though it need not be unique. When it is not
unique, G(q) represents some arbitrary selection from the set of groups satisfying
this condition. Let Γ(q)d e n o t et h es e to fM − 1 individuals which is the com-
plement of G(q) ∪ {i(T)} in I. The support of individuals in Γ(q)i sn o tr e q u i r e d
for the passage of ϕi(q,P) (although in any given instance some members of this
group may nevertheless prefer this outcome to q). Thus, one can think of Γ(q)
as the “minority.” Finally, we deﬁne ϕ−1
i(T)(p,P)a st h es e to fp o l i c i e sq such that
p = ϕi(T)(q,P). Note that this inverse exists for all p ∈ Φi(T)(P).
Step 1: As in the proof of theorem 3, we proceed by demonstrating that
Φi(T)(P) has the following three properties.
Property 1: Ei(T) ∈ Φi(T)(P). As before, this is straightforward, since Ei(T) =
ϕi(T)(Ei(T),P).
Property 2: For any p ∈ Φi(T)(P)a n dq ∈ ϕ−1
i(T)(p,P), we have |pj| =0f o ra l l
j ∈ Γ(q).
Suppose not. Consider any policy q ∈ ϕ−1




(in other words, delete all elementary policies associated with individuals in Γ(q)
from p). Plainly, all j ∈ G(q) ∪ {i(T)} strictly prefer p0 to p and weakly prefer p
to q,s op0 ∈ Z (q,P). But since i(T) prefers p0 to p, this contradicts the fact that
p = ϕi(T) (q,P).
Property 3: For any p ∈ Φi(T)(P)w i t hp 6= Ei(T),w eh a v eC(p) >C (Ei(T)).
By assumption A5, this is obviously the case for any p with |p| ≥ M −1. So for
the remainder of this proof, we focus on the case of p with |p| <M− 1. Consider
any q ∈ ϕ−1
i(T)(p,P). Note for future reference that |pj| =0f o rs o m ej ∈ G(q)( s i n c e
|p| <M− 1).
We prove property 3 through a series of three claims.
Claim 1: C(q) ≥ C(p). Assume on the contrary that C(p) >C (q). For all
j ∈ G(q)w i t h|pj| =0 ,w eh a v evj(p)=−C(p) < −C(q) ≤ vj(q), which contradicts
j ∈ G(q).
Claim 2: If C(q)=C(p), then p = Ei(T). By assumption A2, C(q)=C(p)
implies q = p. Assume contrary to the claim that p 6= Ei(T).T h e r e a r e t w o c a s e s
to consider.








¯ ¯ ¯ =1f o rj ∈ G(q), and
¯ ¯ ¯p0
j
¯ ¯ ¯ =0f o rj/ ∈ G(q) ∪ {i(T)}. By assumption A6, all41
j ∈ G(q) ∪ {i(T)} strictly prefer p0 to p.S i n c e p = q,w eh a v ep0 ∈ Z(q,P). Since
i(T) strictly prefers p to p0,w eh a v ep 6= ϕi(T)(q,P), a contradiction.
Case 2: |pj∗| > 0f o rs o m ej∗ 6= i(T). Consider p0 constructed as follows:
p0 = p\Ej∗. All individuals but j∗ strictly prefer p0 to p.S i n c ep = q, p0 ∈ Z(q,P).
Since i(T) strictly prefers p0 to p,w eh a v ep 6= ϕi(T)(q,P), a contradiction.
Claim 3: If C(q) >C (p)a n dp 6= Ei(T),t h e nC(p) >C (Ei(T)). We prove claim
3 through a series of three steps. Throughout, we assume that C(q) >C (p)a n d
p 6= Ei(T).
3.1: ∃j∗ ∈ G(q) such that |pj∗| > 0. Suppose not. Then, by property 2, |pj| =0
for all j 6= i(T). Arguing exactly as in the proof of case 1 for claim 2, this can only
be the case if p = Ei(T), a contradiction.
3.2: |qj| > 0 for all j ∈ Γ(q). Suppose on the contrary that there exists some
j ∈ Γ(q) such that |qj| = 0. Then, since C(q) >C (p), we have vj(p) >v j(q). In
that case, p is preferred to q by all members of G(q)∪{i(T),j}, which constitutes a
supermajority. Consider p0 deﬁned as follows: p0 = p\Ej∗ (where j∗ was identiﬁed in
step 3.1). Note that p0 is strictly preferred to p by all individuals in G(q)∪{i(T),j}
except for j∗.S i n c e p is preferred to q by all members of this same group, a strict
majority prefers p0 to q.T h u s , p0 ∈ Z(q,P). Since i(T)s t r i c t l yp r e f e r sp0 to p,w e
have p 6= ϕi(T)(q), a contradiction.
3.3: pi(T) = Ei(T) (from which it follows immediately that C(p) >C (Ei(T)), as
desired). Suppose not. Divide the set G(q) into the following two subsets:
A = {j ∈ G(q) | C(pj) <C (qj) − c} and B = G(q)\A.




j =0 = pj for j ∈ Γ(q),
p0
j ⊇ pj and
¯ ¯p0
j
¯ ¯ = |pj| +1f o rj ∈ A,
p0
j = qj for j ∈ B.
Note that C(p0
j) ≤ C(pj)+c for all j ∈ G(q). Thus, C(p0) ≤ C(p)+
¡
K + M − 1
¢
c.42
Note also that C(p0


























(M − 1)c − Kc
¤
<C (q)
(where we have used step 3.2 for the second inequality and A5 for the ﬁnal inequal-
ity). Thus, C(p0) <C (q).
Consider any j ∈ A ∪ {i(T)}.N o t e t h a t










by assumption A6. Thus, all such j strictly prefer p0 to p.S i n c e A ∪ {i(T)} ⊆
G(q) ∪ {i(T)}, these same individuals strictly prefer p to q, and therefore strictly
prefer p0 to q.
Now consider any j ∈ B.S i n c e p0
j = qj,w eh a v evj(p0)−vj(q)=C(q)−C(p0) > 0.
Thus, all such j strictly prefer p0 to q.
From the preceding, it follows that all j ∈ G(q) ∪ {i(T)} strictly prefer p0 to
q.T h u s , p0 ∈ Z(q,P). But since i(T) strictly prefers p0 to p,t h i si m p l i e st h a t
p 6= ϕi(T)(q,P), which is a contradiction.
Step 2: Now we argue that Ei(T) is a Condorcet winner in Φi(T)(P). By
property 1, we know that Ei(T) ∈ Φi(T)(P). Consider any p ∈ Φi(T)(P) other than
Ei(T).L e t q be any policy in ϕ−1
i(T)(p,P). By properties 2 and 3, we know that,
for all j ∈ Γ(q), we have vj(Ei(T)) − vj(p)=C(p) − C(Ei(T)) > 0. Thus, all such
j strictly prefer Ei(T) to p. Obviously, i(T) also strictly prefers Ei(T) to p.S i n c e
|Γ(q)| = M − 1, a majority of individuals strictly prefer Ei(T) to p, as required.
Step 3: To complete the proof of the theorem, we apply lemma 1 and theorem
2, exactly as in the proof of theorem 3. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m9 :Consider any p ∈ Φi(T)(P). Throughout, we use q to
denote some policy for which p = ϕi(T)(q,P) (if there is more than one such policy,
we select one arbitrarily).43
The proof of this theorem requires the following two preliminary results.
Lemma 9.1: Suppose Ns ≥ N∗. Consider any decisive set L ⊆ E with s ∈ L.
Then there is a minimally decisive set L0 ⊆ L with s ∈ L0.
Proof: Let S ≡ |L|. Let the function µ : {1,...,S} → L be such that, for
all l ∈ {1,...,S},w eh a v e( i )f o ra l ll,l0 ∈ {1,...,S}, µ(l) 6= µ(l0), (ii) for all l ∈
{2,...,S}, Nµ(l) ≥ Nµ(l−1),a n d( i i i )i fNµ(l) = Ns for some l with µ(l) 6= s,t h e n
l<µ −1(s). In other words, µ−1(·) indexes the elements of L in order of increasing
size (with s placed after other groups of equal size). Since L is decisive, we know
that
PS
l=1 Nµ(l) ≥ M.M o r e o v e r , Nµ(S) <M(otherwise we would have N∗ =
Nµ(S) ≥ M, which would violate A7). Accordingly, there exists some integer z ∈
{1,...,S} such that
PS
l=z Nµ(l) ≥ M and
PS
l=z+1 Nµ(l) <M.L e t L0 = {µ(z),µ(z +
1),...,µ(S)}.I n l i g h t o f ( i i ) ,
PS
l=z+1 Nµ(l) <Mimplies that
P
j∈L0 Nj−Nk <Mfor
all k ∈ L0.T h u s , L0 is minimally decisive. Let L00 = {l ∈ E | Nl >N ∗}.I n l i g h t




j∈L00 Nj <M .
Thus, z ≤ µ−1(s), which implies s ∈ L0. Q.E.D.
Lemma 9.2: There exists p0 ∈ Z(q,P) such that r(i(T)) ∈ p0 and p0 ⊆ L for some
L ∈ Λ.
Proof: There are two cases to consider.
Case 1: r(i(T)) ∈ q.
If q is not decisive, take p0 = {r(i(T))}.N o t i c e t h a t p0 is preferred to q (weakly
if q = p0) for the decisive set E\q,s op0 ∈ Z(q,P). Moreover, we know that
{r(i(T))} ⊆ L for some L ∈ Λ (this follows directly from lemma 9.1, since one can
always ﬁnd a decisive set containing r(i(T))).
If q is minimally decisive, simply take p0 = q.
If q is decisive but not minimally decisive, then, by lemma 9.1, there exists some




j∈q cj,a l l
j ∈ p0 strictly prefer p0 to q,s op0 ∈ Z(q,P).
Case 2: r(i(T)) / ∈ q.
First suppose that
P
j∈q Nj ≥ M. By deleting elements of q starting with those
associated with the smallest groups and moving to the largest, one can ﬁnd some
q0 ⊂ q such that M>
P





j∈q cj. Thus, all individuals in any group l ∈ E\q0 strictly prefer44
q00 to q.B y c o n s t r u c t i o n , E\q0 is decisive. By lemma 9.1, we know there exists
some L ⊆ E\q0 with r(i(T)) ∈ L and L ∈ Λ.L e t p0 = L ∩ q00. Individuals within
groups belonging to L (weakly) prefer p0 to q00, and strictly prefer q00 to q.T h u s ,
p0 = Z(q,P), as required.
Now imagine that
P
j∈q Nj <M. N o t et h a tt h es e tE\q is decisive. Thus, by
lemma 9.1, there is a minimally decisive set p0 ⊆ E\q with r(i(T)) ∈ p0. By A8, all
individuals belonging to groups within p0 strictly prefer p0 to q.T h u s , p0 ∈ Z(q,P).
Q.E.D.
Now we return to the proof of the theorem. Much as in the proof of theorem 3,
we proceed by establishing three properties of Φi(T)(P).
Property 1: {r(i(T))} ∈ Φi(T)(P).
Since {r(i(T))} is the favorite policy of individual i(T), we have {r(i(T))} =
ϕi(T)({r(i(T))},P).
Property 2: p ∈ Φi(T)(P)i m p l i e sp ⊆ L for some L ∈ Λ.
Assume not. Let Ψ denote the set of groups that (weakly) prefer p to q.C l e a r l y ,
Ψ is decisive, and Ψ contains r(i(T)). From lemma 9.1, we know that there exists
some L ∈ Λ with L ⊆ Ψ and r({i(T)}) ∈ L. Consider the policy p0 = p∩L. Since it




l∈p cl. Consequently, all
members of any group j ∈ p0 (including r(i(T))) strictly prefer p0 to p. Since these
individuals also (weakly) prefer p to q, they strictly prefer p0 to q, which implies
p0 ∈ Z(q,P). But since i(T) strictly prefers p0 to p, this contradicts p ∈ ϕi(T)(q,P).
Property 3: p ∈ Φi(T)(P)i m p l i e sr(i(T)) ∈ p.
Suppose that the property is false, i.e. that there exists p ∈ Φi(T)(P)w i t h
r(i(T)) 6∈ p.T h e n vi(T)(p) ≤ 0. Lemma 9.2 establishes the existence of some
p0 ∈ Z(q,P) such that r(i(T)) ∈ p0 and p0 ⊆ L for some L ∈ Λ.C l e a r l y , vi(T)(p0) ≥
vi(T)(L) > 0, where the second inequality follows from A8. Thus, p 6∈ ϕi(T)(q,P),
which is a contradiction.
Now we prove the theorem. In particular, we claim that {r(i(T))} is a Condorcet
winner in Φi(T)(P). By property 1, we know that {r(i(T))} ∈ Φi(T)(P). Consider
any other p ∈ Φi(T)(P). By property 3,
P
j∈p cj >c r(i(T)). Thus, all individuals
within groups j ∈ E\p strictly prefer {r(i(T))} to p, as do individuals within r(i(T)).
Note that the set of individuals who strictly prefer {r(i(T))} to p can be written
as E\(p\{r(i(T))}). Since, by property 2, p ⊆ L for some L ∈ Λ, we know that
p\{r(i(T))} is not decisive. But then E\(p\{r(i(T))}) is decisive, as required.45
Since {r(i(T))} is a Condorcet winner in Φi(T)(P), we know (from the argu-
ment used in the proof of Theorem 2) that, for all p ∈ Q1(P), we have vi(p) ≥
vi ({r(i(T))}) for all i ∈ J00 ≡ {j | j = i(t)f o rs o m et =1 ,...,T − 1}, and hence
for all i ∈∪ j∈J00Ir(j).I f J00 ∩ Ir(i(T)) is non-empty, then the fact that vi(p) ≥





¯ ¯ ≥ M, in which case the fact that vi(p) ≥ vi ({r(i(T))}) for all
i ∈∪ j∈J00Ir(j) implies p = {r(i(T))} (otherwise {r(i(T))} would not be a Condorcet
winner). Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 0 :The theorem is trivial when ε ≥ 1/N. Consequently,
assume ε < 1/N. We begin with two lemmas.
Lemma 10.1: Consider any pT−1 ∈ ∆N−1
ε . Under either of the following condi-
tions, there exists some set of individuals S with i(T) 6∈ S and |S| = M − 1
such that (QT(pT−1))l =0if and only if l ∈ S.
(i) QT(pT−1) 6= pT−1,
(ii)(QT(pT−1))i(T) < 1 − Nε.
Proof: (i) Since QT(pT−1) 6= pT−1,t h e r ee x i s t sas e tS00 with i(T) 6∈ S00
and |S00| = M − 1 such that (QT(pT−1))l > (pT−1)l ≥ 0f o rl ∈ S00. We claim
that (QT(pT−1))l =0f o ra l ll ∈ E\(S00 ∪ {i(T)}). Suppose not. Consider p0
constructed as follows: p0
l =0f o rl ∈ E\(S00 ∪ {i(T)}), p0
l =( QT(pT−1))l for
l ∈ S00,a n dp0
i(T) =( QT(pT−1))i(T) +
P
i∈E\S00 (QT(pT−1))i (in other words, divert
all surplus from members of E\(S00 ∪ {i(T)})t oi(T)). Plainly, p0
l > (pT−1)l for
l ∈ S00 ∪ {i(T)}.S i n c e |S00 ∪ {i(T)}| = M,t h ep o l i c yp0 would pass if proposed
in round T;s i n c ep0
i(T) > (QT(pT−1))i(T), individual i(T) would therefore have
an incentive to propose it. But this contradicts the hypothesis that QT(pT−1)
is i(T)’s optimal proposal. Since (QT(pT−1))l =0f o rl ∈ E\(S00 ∪ {i(T)})a n d
|E\(S00 ∪ {i(T)})| = M − 1, we must have (QT(pT−1))i(T) > (pT−1)i(T) ≥ 0( o r
QT(pT−1) would not pass). Taking S = E\(S00 ∪ {i(T)}) delivers the desired
conclusion.
(ii) In light of part (i), we prove this by showing that QT(pT−1) 6= pT−1. Sup-
pose on the contrary that QT(pT−1)=pT−1.S i n c e( pT−1)i(T) < 1 − Nε,w eh a v e
P
j6=i(T) (pT−1)j ≥ (N +1 )ε, which implies the existence of a set S0 with i(T) 6∈ S046
and |S0| = N−1






ε = Mε.I ti st h e r e f o r e
possible to construct a policy p0 with the property that p0
j ≥ (pT−1)j+ε for all j 6∈ S0.
All members of E\S0, including i(T), strictly prefer p0 to pT−1.S i n c e |E\S0| = M,
the policy p0 would pass if proposed in round T,a n di(T)w o u l dt h e r e f o r eh a v ea n
incentive to propose it. But this contradicts the hypothesis that QT(pT−1)=pT−1.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 10.2: Consider any set A with i(T) 6∈ A and |A| = M − 1. Deﬁne the
policy xA as follows: xA
i(T) =1 −(M−1)ε; for l ∈ A, xA
l = ε; for l 6∈ A∪{i(T)},
xA
l =0 . Then Qt(xA)=xA for all t =1 ,...,T.












i(T), which implies that i(T)w o u l dn o tp r o p o s eQT(xA), a contradiction.
Now suppose that Qt+1(xA)=xA. Imagine that, contrary to the claim,















i(T).B u t t h e n w e









l .S i n c e|A| = M −1, there is at least on individual, j∗,i nb o t hA
and B.
Consider some equilibrium from round t onward, given pt−1 = xA,f o rw h i c ht h e
outcome is Qt(xA). Let pA
T−1 denote the status quo at the outset of round T on
the equilibrium path. Plainly, QT(pA
T−1)=Qt(xA). There are two possibilities.
(i) pA
T−1 = QT(pA




















l + ε for l ∈ E\D.
Since pA
T−1 = Qt(xA)a n d|E\D| = M,i fp0 is proposed in round T,i tw i l lp a s s .
Since i(T) prefers p0 to Qt(xA), i(T)w i l lp r o p o s ep0, which contradicts the hypothesis
that the outcome is Qt(xA).
(ii) pA
T−1 6= QT(pA
T−1). Then, by lemma 10.1 part (i), there exists a set S with
i(T) 6∈ S and |S| = M − 1 such that (QT(pT−1))l =0f o ra l ll ∈ S.B u t t h i s
contradicts the existence of the set B. Q.E.D.
Now suppose, contrary to the theorem, that there exists p0 such that (Q1(p0))i(T) <
1 − Nε. Consider some equilibrium resulting in the outcome Q1(p0), and suppose
that, for each t =1 ,..,T,t h ep o l i c yb pt−1 is the status quo at the outset of each round47
t on the equilibrium path (by construction b p0 = p0). Plainly, Qt(b pt−1)=Q1(p0).
We claim that, for all t ∈ 1,...,T − 1, we have (Qt+1(b pt−1))i(T) < 1 − Nε.
Suppose on the contrary that there is some t0 for which (Qt0+1(b pt0−1))i(T) ≥ 1−Nε.
Then we know that, in equilibrium, b pt0 6= b pt0−1 is proposed in round t0 and it passes
(so that the outcome is Qt0+1(b pt0) rather than Qt0+1(b pt0−1)). But, by lemma 10.1
part (ii), there exists a set of individuals S with i(T) 6∈ S and |S| = M − 1s u c h
that (Qt0+1(b pt0))l =( QT(b pT−1))l =0f o ra l ll ∈ S.M o r e o v e r , ( Qt0+1(b pt0))i(T) <
(Qt0+1(b pt0−1))i(T). Thus, under the assumption that those who are indiﬀerent vote
against proposals, at least M individuals (those in S∪{i(T)}) vote against b pt0,w h i c h
contradicts the hypothesis that b pt0 passes.
Since (Qt+1(b pt−1))i(T) < 1 − Nε,w ek n o wf r o ml e m m a1 0 . 1p a r t( i i )t h a t ,f o r
every round t, there exists some set of individuals S(t)w i t hi(T) 6∈ S(t)a n d|S(t)| =
M−1 such that (Qt+1(b pt−1))l =0i fa n do n l yi fl ∈ S(t). Imagine that i(t)p r o p o s e s
xS(t) (as described in lemma 10.2, with A = S(t)). If the proposal passes, we know
by lemma 10.2 that the outcome is xS(t).S i n c e x
S(t)
l > (Qt+1(b pt−1))l for all l ∈ S(t)
as well as for l = i(T)( g i v e nt h a t( Qt+1(b pt−1))i(T) < 1 − Nε), we know that the
proposal passes (given that |S(t) ∪ {i(T)}| = M). Consider the case where i(T)
proposes more than once. In any round t<Tfor which i(t)=i(T), individual
i(T) would gain by deviating to the proposal xS(t), contradicting the assumption of
equilibrium. Now consider the case where |J| >M . We know from lemma 10.1
part (ii) that there is some t00 ∈ {1,...,T−1} such that (Qt00+1(b pt00))i(t00) =0 ,w h i c h
implies (Qt00+1(b pt00−1))i(t00) = 0 (otherwise i(t00) would propose b pt00−1), and hence
i(t00) ∈ S(t00). But then individual i(t00) would gain by deviating to the proposal
xS(t00), contradicting the assumption of equilibrium. Q.E.D.48
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